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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that section 5 of the Bill of Rights requires the development 
of proportionality as a separate head of judicial review where limitations to 
rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill of Rights are at issue. The paper 
considers the development of the principle of proportionality in the United 
Kingdom as a separate head of review where Convention rights and freedoms 
are at issue under the Human Rights Act 1998. The United Kingdom experience 
under the Human Rights Act and Canadian experience under the Charter both 
suggest that the New Zealand courts have failed to take the correct approach to 
section 5 in the context of judicial review. This is supported by consideration of 
New Zealand' s international obligations under the ICCPR, both with respect to 
permissible limitations and the obligation to provide an effective remedy. 
Judicial review restricted to the traditional heads of review, even following a 
"heightened scrutiny" Wednesbury standard, cannot meet the requirements 
under section 5 to determine the lawfulness of limits to rights and freedoms and 
will not meet New Zealand ' s obligation to provide an effective remedy under 
the ICCPR. In order to meet their constitutional duty, and their legal duty under 
the Bill of Rights, the courts must apply the principle of proportionality to 
determine the legality of limits to rights or freedoms imposed by executive or 
administrative action in judicial review. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises 14,747 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The principle of proportionality 1s a test used in vanous domestic 
jurisdictions and internationally to determine whether a limit on a fundamental 
right or freedom is justified, constitutional or lawful. Proportionality has 
emerged as a ground of review in the United Kingdom under their Human 
Rights Act 1998 (Human Rights Act). The Principle of Proportionality is used as 
part of the section 1 justified limitation test in judicial review under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). It is used by various 
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jurisdictions to determine the constitutionality of limits to constitutionally 
protected rights. It is the test required under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1 and the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention)2 for limitations 
required to be "necessary in a democratic society". 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights) should have 
had a significant impact on judicial review in New Zealand. Section 5 of the Bill 
of Rights requires limitations on rights to be reasonable, prescribed by law and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This paper argues that 
section 5 imports the principle of proportionality into New Zealand law, which 
should have emerged as a separate head of review with respect to administrative 
action limiting rights and freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights. To date this 
has not been recognised by the courts. This paper does not consider the wider 
question as to whether proportionality should be a separate ground of review in 
cases where a Bill of Rights right or freedom is not at issue. 
In contrast to New Zealand, the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 
m the United Kingdom has had an immediate impact on judicial review of 
administrative decisions. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Daly (Daly) the English courts ended the uncertainty regarding the 
existence of proportionality as a distinct head of review, at least with respect to 
1ights and freedoms protected by the Human Rights Act.3 In New Zealand there 
has been cautious early recognition of the applicability of the Canadian test to 
section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights),4 though it 
was not until 10 years after the entry into force of the Bill of Rights that the test 
was explicitly advocated. 5 
This paper considers the principle of proportionality in its international 
context and in the context of the United Kingdom, in particular under the 
Human Rights Act, to provide a context for discussion of proportionality in 
judicial review under the Bill of Rights Act. The "increased scrutiny" test 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
2 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 
November 1950) 213 UNTS 221. 
3 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex pa rte Daly [2001) 3 All ER 433, para 26 
per Lord Steyn (HL(E)). 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260,283 Richardson J (CA). 
5 Moonen v Film a11d Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 (CA). 
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developed by the courts in the United Kingdom prior to the entry into force of 
the Human Rights Act is considered, as the New Zealand position currently is 
analogous to that approach. The international and United Kingdom 
jurisprudence illustrate that this "increased scrutiny" approach cannot act as a 
substitute for the application of the proportionality test where rights are limited. 
The constitutional objections that have been raised against the introduction of 
proportionality as a ground of review are considered. These centre mainly on the 
concern that proportionality involves too high a degree of merits review, thereby 
taking the courts outside their proper constitutional role, and violating the proper 
separation of powers. These objections fail to consider that it is Parliament that 
has laid down the proportionality test by modelling that section on section 1 of 
the Charter. It is the proper constitutional role of the courts to determine the law, 
and whether a limitation to a right or freedom protected by the Bill of Rights is 
lawful. Therefore, as that process requires the application of the proportionality 
test, it is within the proper constitutional role of the courts to use proportionality 
as a ground of review where Bill of Rights' rights or freedoms are at issue. 
II JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A Judicial Review and Constitutional Principle 
The arguments for and against proportionality, considered below, occur 
within the context of the question of the proper constitutional role of the courts 
and the proper extent of judicial review. "Judicial review was a judicial 
invention to secure that decisions are made by the executive or a public body 
according to the law even if the decision does not otherwise involve an 
actionable wrong."6 Judicial review can be seen to rest on the constitutional 
principles of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law: "the sovereignty of 
Parliament and the principle of the rule of law justify the courts in insisting that 
officials properly implement the instructions of the legislature".7 It is the proper 
constitutional role of the courts to determine questions of law, including the 
6 Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Co1poratio11 of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385, 388 
(PC). 
7 Jeffrey Jowell QC "Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review" (2000) 
PL 671,672. 
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determination of the scope of a decision-makers power. 8 Judicial review is 
therefore "grounded in the court's constitutional duty to uphold the rule of 
law"9; it is a judicial invention "to secure the rule of law". 10 Bounding judicial 
review is the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. The courts are 
wary of exceeding their proper constitutional bounds: 11 
Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-
making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, 
the court will. .. under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself 
guilty of abusing power. 
The appeal/review distinction has been grounded in this concern to maintain the 
proper separation of powers between the courts and the other branches of 
government. 
However, as Jowell notes, the principle of the rule of law cannot 
encompass the full range of principles that are of constitutional importance, such 
as "freedom of expression, the right to life, dignity, or even the notion of 
substantive (as opposed to merely formal) equality". 12 Judicial review based 
purely upon the principles of the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty will 
remain very restricted in scope. Administrative law develops according to 
cun-ent perceptions of what is required of the courts in their distinctive judicial 
function 13 , which in tum is influenced and changed by the shifting political, 
legal and social context over time. The recognition of a broader set of 
constitutional values relevant to judicial review is a development that has, in 
particular, arisen out of the human rights movement which gathered momentum 
in the latter part of the twentieth century. Human rights and freedoms are 
8 Bulk Gas Users' Group v Attomey-General (1983] NZLR 129, 136 (CA). 
9 Philip Philip A Joseph "The Demise of Ultra Vires - Judicial Review in the New Zealand 
Courts" (2001) PL 354, 359 - 360 [Joseph Ultra Vires]; Peters v Davison (1999] 2 NZLR 164, 
188 Richardson, Henry Keith JJ (CA); see also Patel v Chief Executive of the Department of 
Labour [1997] l NZLR 102, 110 - 111 (HC). 
10 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 730; Joseph Ultra Vires, above, 359. 
11 Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporatio11 of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385, 389 
(PC), Lord Templeman quoting Lord Brightman in Chief Co11stable of North Wales Police v 
Evans [1982] l WLR 1155, 1173. 
12 Jowell, above, 673. 
13 Thames Valley Electric Power Board v New Zealand Forest Products Pulp & Paper Ltd 
(1994] 2 NZLR 641, 653 Cooke P (CA): "Like other branches of common law, administrative 
law develops and changes according to current perceptions of what is required of the Courts in 
their distinctive judicial function . .. At times it becomes necessary to give especial weight to 
human and civil rights, including class or group rights"; Waitakere City Council v Lovelock 
[1997] 2 NZLR 385, 399 Thomas J (CA). 
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innately constitutional in nature; 14 they are 1ights and freedoms opposable by the 
indi victual against the state, and as such are fetters on state action/power. They 
have a direct impact on the powers of government, though in the Westminster 
system of Parliamentary democracy Parliament may retain the power to override 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 15 
The development of the concept of democracy away from a simple 
majoritarian model to a pluralistic model that recognises the necessity for limits 
based on fundamental human rights and freedoms, and the rights of minorities, 16 
mandates a shift from review based simply on general standards of fairness to 
one based on constitutional values. 17 Such an approach recognises that some 
fundamental human rights and freedoms are " ... anterior to any municipal 
law" 18, they are "inherent and fundamental to democratic society" and human 
rights instruments both domestically and internationally recognise rather than 
create them 19, and as such these fundamental rights are of constitutional 
importance. This shift towards a more pluralistic democracy is represented in 
the New Zealand context by the move to a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) 
electoral system, while the passage of the Bill of Rights gives explicit 
recognition to fundamental human rights and freedoms as constitutional 
14 Philip A Joseph "Constitutional Review Now" (1998) NZ Law Rev 85, 90. 15 There may be a substantive limit to parliamentary sovereignty, where legislative power is 
circumscribed by implied or fundamental common law rights, though this proposition is 
controversial. "Some common law rights presumably run so deep that even Parliament could not 
override them" Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394, 398 Cooke J; see also 
Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 489 - 495. The New Zealand, Canadian and United Kingdom Bills of Rights 
all maintain the legislative supremacy of Parliament. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
expressly insulates inconsistent enactments, which cannot be interpreted consistently in 
accordance with s 6, through s 4. In Canada some of the Charter rights may be overridden when 
an explicit "notwithstanding" clause is inserted in the legislation by Parliament, though the 
clause must be renewed every five years, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 33. The 
Human Rights Act 1998 in the United Kingdom, like the Bill of Rights Act, preserves 
inconsistent enactments, in s 3(2), though the courts have the express power to make a 
declaration of incompatibility (s 4). Once a declaration of incompatibility is made the 
flovernment has the power to amend enactments under s 10 to render them compatible. 6 Lord Irvine of Lairg (3 Nov 1997) 582 HLD ser 5, col 1234: "[the Human Rights Act will] 
deliver a modern reconciliation of the inevitable tension between the democratic right of the 
majority to exercise political power and the democratic need of individuals and minorities to 
have their human rights secured" 
17 Jeffrey Jowell QC "Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review" (2000) 
PL 671,671. 
18 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260,270 Cooke P (CA). 
19 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433,447 para 
30 Lord Cooke ofThorndon (HL(E)). 
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values.20 The increasing recognition of the significance of the treaty of 
Waitangi, and constitutional values extrapolated from the treaty, also represent a 
shift towards a more value based approach. 21 
In the United Kingdom, even before the entry into force of the Human 
Rights Act, the courts recognised "individual democratic rights against the 
state"22 as part of the common law. These were recognised as fundamental 
rights23 or constitutional rights24, as relevant to the review of administrative 
decisions, and as placing limitations on the exercise of administrative powers. 
The entry into force of the Human Rights Act in the United Kingdom has 
expressly incorporated human rights standards as constitutional values fettering 
administrative action, and the Bill of Rights should have had the same effect in 
New Zealand. 
B Traditional Application of Judicial Review: the Appeal/Review 
Distinction 
1 The appeal/review distinction 
The appeal/review distinction is an important element of traditional 
judicial review. Joseph is of the opinion that the distinction serves two purposes: 
to ensure that the courts maintain "judicial deference" and to legitimate judicial 
20 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3: by subjecting the action of the three branches of 
government to the Bill of Rights (subject to s 4) the Bill of Rights has a constitutional role and 
the rights and freedoms contained in it can be seen as constitutional values. Simpson v Attorney 
General {Baigent's Case} (1994] 3 NZLR 667,702 Hardie Boys J (CA): "The New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act is a commitment by the Crown that those who in the three branches of the 
government exercise its functions, powers and duties will observe the rights that the Bill 
affirms". 
21 Philip A Joseph "Constitutional Review Now" (1998) NZ Law Rev 85, 90, 93 - 108. 22 Jowell, above, 672. 
23 For example the right to life requiring the courts to give a decision the "most anxious 
scrutiny" in an asylum case: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Bugdaycay (1987) AC 514,531 Lord Bridge (HL(E)); the right to freedom of expression in R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms (1999] 3 All ER 400 (HL(E)); 
Jowell, above, 674 - 675. 
24 For example the constitutional right of access to justice in R v Secreta,y of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Leech (No 2) [1994] QB 198 (CA); the constitutional right of access to a 
court in R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998) 3 WLR 849 (DC); Jeffrey Jowell QC 
"Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review" (2000) PL 671, 674- 675. 
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review. 25 Inherent in the appeal/review distinction is a concern by the courts to 
maintain their proper constitutional role. It is argued that the limiting of review 
to the legality of the decision, with a focus on the decision making process 
rather than the merits of the decision, keeps review within the court's proper 
constitutional role of ensuring the rule of law and upholding the principle of 
legality. Merits review, it is said, substitutes the decision of the court for that of 
the decision maker, and in doing so the court may exceed its constitutional 
bounds.26 The separation of powers is the principle behind these concerns: 
Parliament has granted the decision maker the discretion, accordingly the 
decision maker is the constitutionally proper person to make the decision; so if 
the court oversteps the mark in review it could potentially impinge on the 
constitutional role of both the legislative and executive branches. 
However, the irrationality ground of review includes merits review on 
the ground of Wednesbury unreasonableness27 . Wednesbury unreasonableness is 
a consideration of the merits, 28 albeit with such a high threshold of application 
in its traditional formulation that it will be met in only the most extreme cases.29 
The initially very high threshold of unreasonableness required for a decision to 
be impugned on Wednesbury unreasonableness grounds has given way to a 
sliding scale of review, dependent on the context of the review, with higher 
intensity review, such as the ex parte Smith30 approach, lowering the threshold. 31 
25 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law i11 New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 742. 
26 Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Co1poratio11 of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385, 389 
Lord Templemann (PC) quoting Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] l 
WLR 1155, 1173 Lord Brightman (HL(E)). 
27 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Co,poration [ 1948] l KB 223. 
28 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 738 - 739. 
29 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410 Lord 
Diplock (HL(E)): a decision is irrational if it is "so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of 
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it"; Joseph, above, 831 - 837. However, in practice the test has not 
been applied in its full rigour: Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [1997] 2 NZLR 385, 399 
Thomas J (CA): "Yet, as most judges know, and many commentators have observed, the actual 
decisions of the courts do not reflect the severity of the test. The Courts in practice are willing to 
impugn decisions which are far from absurd or perverse and, indeed, even at times coldly 
rational". 
30 R v Ministry of Defence, ex pa rte Smith [ 1996] QB 517 (CA) discussed below in Part III(D). 
31 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd [1998] NZAR 58, 
66 (CA); Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 403 Thomas J; Joseph, above, 834 - 839; 
Electoral Commission v Cameron [1997] 2 NZLR 421, 433 (CA): " ... it would seem entirely 
appropriate in such circumstances to have regard to any encroachment upon statutory functions 
and powers conferred on public authorities and to apply a somewhat lower standard of 
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On this ground of review the degree of merits review 1s greater or lesser 
depending on the context of review, with a higher degree of review of the merits 
where human rights are concemed. 32 The appeal/review distinction, in so far as 
it purports to rest on a bright line distinction between merits and procedural 
review, has been eroded to this extent by the development of administrative law, 
without breaching the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. 
The recognition of constitutional values, such as fundamental rights and 
freedoms opposable to the state, as a basis for review further challenges the 
strict appeal/review dichotomy. Fundamental rights and freedoms are 
substantive legal guarantees; the courts' review of decisions limiting those 
substantive guarantees cannot merely assess the procedural aspects of the 
decision to impose a limitation without failing in their constitutional duty to 
uphold the rule of law. As will become clear in the discussion below, the 
assessment of the legality of a limit on a fundamental right or freedom 
necessitates consideration of the merits of the case. A limitation is not lawful 
merely because the decision maker adhered to all the procedural requirements in 
making their decision to impose the limit. Ultimately, it is the constitutional 
duty of the court to determine the legality of any limitations to fundamental 
rights or freedoms. 33 
reasonableness than 'irrationality' in the strict sense"; at the high end of the scale is Wellingto11 
City Council v Woolworths New Zealand (No 2) (1996] 2 NZLR 537 (CA): "For the ultimate 
decisions to be invalidated as "unreasonable", to repeat expressions used in the cases, they must 
be so "perverse", "absurd" or "outrageous in [their] defiance of logic" that Parliament could not 
have contemplated such decisions being made by an elected council". 
32 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd, above, 66: "In 
some cases, such as those involving human rights, a less restricted approach, even perhaps, to 
use the expression commonly adopted in the United States, a 'hard look ', may be needed"; 
Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 403 Thomas J. 
33 At the very least this is a legal duty imposed by sections 3 and 5 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. The courts are bound to act consistently with the Bill of Rights by section 3, 
while section 5 makes any limit not protected by section 4 unlawful if it does not meet the 
criteria set out. The courts have a constitutional duty to determine the law, and therefore they 
have a constitutional duty to determine the legality of any limits imposed on the rights and 
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights. A similar duty arises with respect to common law 
rights via the presumption that Parliament will not legislate to restrict common law rights in 
anything less than express terms; for example in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Daly (2001] 3 All ER 433, 437 Lord Bingham of Cornhill held that a 
prisoner's rights to access to the courts and legal advice "may be curtailed only by clear and 
express words, and then only to the extent necessary to meet the ends which justify the 
curtailment". As a result administrative action limiting common law rights will be subjected to 
close scrutiny by the courts in judicial review. 
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2 Judicial deference 
The concept of "deference", or a "margin of appreciation", may provide 
the necessary "principled distance" between the court and the decision-maker34 
to preserve the constitutional balance between the courts and the other branches 
of government in merits review. The House of Lords addressed the issue of 
judicial deference in R (on the application of Prolife Alliance) v British 
Broadcasting Corporation, noting that any "overtones of servility, or perhaps 
gracious concession, are [not] appropriate to describe what is happening", Lord 
Hoffman went on to say: 35 
In a society based upon the rule of law and the separation of powers, it is 
necessary to decide which branch of government has in any particular instance 
the decision-making power and what the legal limits of that power are. That 
is a question of law and must therefore be decided by the courts ... [The 
court's] allocation of decision-making power to the other branches of 
government is [not] a matter of courtesy or deference. The principles upon 
which decision-making powers are allocated are principles of law. .. The 
principle that the independence of the courts is necessary for a proper decision 
of disputed legal rights or claims of violation of human rights is a legal 
principle. It is reflected in art 6 of the Convention. On the other hand, the 
principle that majority approval is necessary for a proper decision on policy or 
allocation of resources is also a legal principle. Likewise, when a court 
decides that a decision is within the proper competence of the legislature or 
executive, it is not showing deference . It is deciding the law. [emphasis 
added] 
In the context of judicial review of any administrative action limiting 
fundamental rights and freedoms, the determination of the limits on the relevant 
decision making power is the crucial issue, and the determination of that issue is 
squarely within the proper constitutional function of the courts. 
III THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
The principle of proportionality functions as an evaluative test for the 
justifiability of limitations on human rights and freedoms, constitutional values 
34 R (Mahmood) v Home Secretary [2001] l WLR 840, 855 para 33 Laws LJ (CA). 
35 R ( 011 the application of Prolife Alliance v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 
23, paras 75 - 76 Lord Hoffman (HL(E)). 
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or other legal rights. The principle of proportionality 1s the test used to 
determine whether limitations are "necessary",36 "reasonable"37 or 
"demonstrably justified"38 m a democratic society. The principle of 
proportionality involves three steps, although in some jurisdictions the third step 
is split into two separate steps.39 The principle of proportionality asks whether a 
limitation satisfies three criteria: 
(1) That the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify 
limiting a fundamental right, 
(2) That the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are 
rationally connected to it, and 
(3) That the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more 
than is necessary to accomplish the objective.40 
This last step involves an analysis of the proportionality of the limitation, and 
care must be taken not to confuse the "principle of proportionality" with this last 
step of the principle. 
A Civil Law Origins and European Court of Human Rights Application 
The principle of proportionality originally stems from civil law 
jurisdictions. In Germany, for example, the principle is an unwritten 
36 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, art 
21: "The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognised. No restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society". The principle of proportionality is the test for " necessary" in 
this art: Manfred Nowak UN Covenant 0 11 Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP 
Engel, Arlington (Va), 1993) 378 - 379. 
37 Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, s 12(4). Under this section limits to the right to freedom 
of expression of public officers must be "reasonably required for the proper performance of their 
functions" and must be "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society". The Privy Council held 
that the proportionality test was the correct test for assessing whether a limit was reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society: de Freitas v Ministry of Agriculture [1999] l AC 69, 80 (PC). 
38 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s l: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". The 
proportionality test was laid down by the Supreme Court for the "demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society" element of s l in R v Oakes [1986] l SCR 103 (SCC). 
39 This is the test used in de Freitas v Minist,y of Agriculture [1999] l AC 69, 80 (PC) and R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433, para 27 Lord 
Steyn (HL(E)). 
40 This last step is sometimes split into two elements, as in the Canadian test in R v Oakes, 
above. Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (4 ed, Cars wells, Toronto, 1997) 878 - 879: 
The two steps are "(3) Least drastic means: the law must impair the right no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective. (4) Proportionate effect: the law must not have a 
disproportionately severe effect on the persons to whom it applies" 
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constitutional principle that has application to administrative and legislative 
measures and is based on the "Rechtsstaatsprinzip" which entitles a citizen to 
" ... a fundamental right or freedom against the State".41 
The principle of proportionality has been applied by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) to European Community Law42 and by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) to cases brought under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (the Convention).43 This paper is concerned with the principle of 
proportionality with respect to human rights and will not consider its application 
in the European Community law context. 
In the context of the ECHR the principle of proportionality arises out of 
the requirement for limitations to many of the Convention rights and freedoms 
to be "necessary in a democratic society".44 In order to meet this test limitations 
must be required to meet a "pressing social need", the interference must be 
"proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" and the reasons adduced by the 
state for imposing the limitation must be "relevant and sufficient".45 In addition 
limitations must be prescribed by law and for one of the specified purposes 
included with respect to each right or freedom. 46 This approach is similar to the 
approach under the ICCPR considered below in part IV(A). In cases where 
limitations have been imposed by Jaw for an allowable purpose it is often on the 
proportionality of the limitation that the case tums.47 
In the ECHR the rigour of the proportionality approach can be mitigated 
by the margin of appreciation that the Court will give to states. The margin of 
appreciation is granted on the grounds that the domestic authorities are in a 
better position to determine domestic matters, from a closer and more intimate 
41 Walter van Gerven 'The Effect of Proportionality on the Actions of Member States" in Evelyn 
Ellis (ed) The Pri11ciple of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart, Oxford, 1999), 37, 44. 
42 Francis G Jacobs "Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European 
Community Law" in Evelyn Ellis (ed) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe 
(Hart, Oxford, 1999), l. 
43 Jeremy McBride "Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights" in Evelyn 
Ellis (ed) The Pri11ciple of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart, Oxford, 1999), 23. 
44 For example European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 221, art 8 right to respect for private and family life, 
art 9 freedom of thought conscience and religion, art 10 freedom of expression and art 11 
freedom of assembly and association. 
45 For example: Lingens v Austria ( 1986) 8 EHRR 103, paras 39 - 40. 
46 For example: public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others with respect to art 9 of the Convention. 
47 Berend Hovius "The Limitation Clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights" 
(1985) 17 Ottawa L Rev 213 , 241. 
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connection and understanding of local conditions than an international judge 
could have.48 For example, a margin of appreciation is afforded to states in 
determining whether a pressing social need for a limitation exists.49 The margin 
of appreciation is also extended to other parts of the ECHR's analysis of cases; 
for example, where the pressing social need is the protection of morals, the 
Court grants a wide margin of appreciation to the determination of the 
requirements of domestic morals as well as the necessity of a restriction 
intended to protect those morals.so A similar approach is taken when the 
pressing social need is the protection of the religious feelings of others.s 1 The 
ECHR has acknowledged that "[t]he scope of the margin of appreciation will 
vary according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its background".s2 
The application of the margin of appreciation by the ECHR is not without its 
critics; it is claimed, for example, that the doctrine is ill-defined and the role in 
the court's reasoning is not always clear.s3 
B The Principle of Proportionality in Canada 
The Canadian courts have used the principle of proportionality as part of 
the limitations test required under section 1 of the Charter.s4 The Oakes test 
requires the principle of prop01tionality to be applied to determine whether a 
limitation is "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".ss The 
48 Muller v Switzerland (1988) 13 EHRR 212, 228- 229 para 35. 
49 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 103, para 39. 
50 Muller v Switzerland, above, 228 - 229 para 35: "The view taken of the requirement of morals 
varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era, characterised as it is by a 
far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better 
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
requirements as well as the ' necessity' of a 'restriction' or ' penalty' intended to meet them". 
51 Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34, 57 - 58 para 50. 
52 Rasmussen v Denmark (1984) 7 EHRR 371, 380 para 40. 
53 See Nicholas Lavender "The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation" (1997) 4 EHRLR 380. 
54 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s l: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". 
55 R v Oakes [1986] l SCR 103, 138-139; Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (4 ed, 
Carswell, Toronto, 1997) 877-879: "There are four criteria to be satisfied by a law that can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society: l. Sufficiently important objective: The 
law must pursue an objective that is sufficiently important to justify limiting a Charter Right. 2. 
Rational connection: the law must be rationally connected to the objective. 3. Least drastic 
means: The law must impair the right no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective. 4. 
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Canadian approach is significant for New Zealand as section 5 of the Bill of 
Rights was modelled on section l of the Charter.56 As the Charter is supreme 
law in Canada any legislation that limits Charter rights and freedoms that does 
not pass the section l test will be struck down by the Courts. There is a savings 
provision that allows the federal or provincial legislatures to insulate legislation 
which does not meet the section l test by the insertion of a "notwithstanding" 
clause into the statute. 57 
In judicial review of administrative action any decision affecting Charter 
rights of freedoms will be set aside as unlawful if it cannot be justified under 
section 1.58 Lamer J, speaking for the court on this issue in Slaight 
Communications, held that as administrative discretions were conferred by 
statute they were caught by the Charter. Unless the discretion expressly 
conferred, or by way of necessary implication conferred, a power to infringe the 
Charter, all such discretions could not infringe the Charter.59 Where the 
legislation does confer such a power then the legislation itself must be tested 
against section 1 of the Charter. If the legislation fails that test it is 
unconstitutional and the order made under it is also unconstitutional.60 There is 
no infringement of the Charter where the exercise of a discretion limiting a 
Charter right or freedom constitutes a justified limitation under section 1 of the 
Charter, so even where there is no express power to infringe the Charter, a 
decision maker can impose justified limitations on Charter rights within the 
scope of their legal discretion. 61 
The Supreme Court addressed the relationship between normal 
administrative review and Charter review In Ross v New Brunswick School 
District No. 1562 . The Court held that where Charter values were at stake, and 
means: The law must impair the right no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective. 4. 
Proportionate effect: The law must not have a disproportionately severe effect on the persons to 
whom it applies." 
56 White Paper A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1985) AJHR A6, para 10.26. 
57 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 33. 
58 David J Mullan Administrative Law (3 ed, Carswell, Scarborough (Ontario), 1996) § 498. 
Discretions may also be struck down for failure to satisfy the "prescribed by law" limb of 
section l. This will not be considered in this paper. 
59 Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson [1989] 1 SCR 1038, 1078 Lamer J (SCC). Lamer J 
dissented in part from the Majority judgement; however the majority endorsed the comments on 
judicial review and the Charter cited in this paper at 1048 - 1049. 
60 Slaight Communications Inc, above, 1079 - 1080 Lamer J. 
61 Slaight Co111mu11ications, above, 1077 - 1081 Lamer J. 
62 Ross v New Brunswick School District No. 15 [ 1996] 62 ACWS (3d) 266 (SCC). 
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the review was made under section 1, then if the decision passed the section 1 
test it could not be "unreasonable" in the normal administrative law sense. If the 
decision fails the section 1 test, then as it is unconstitutional the reasonableness 
of the decision is irrelevant.63 
In the review of legislation against section 1 the Canadian courts show a 
degree of deference to the legislature. Deference is mainly shown at the first 
step, the question whether the objective is sufficiently important to limit the 
right, and the third step, the question whether the least drastic means have been 
used to achieved the objective. The decision of the democratically elected 
legislature is usually accepted as determinative of the issue as to whether the 
objective is sufficiently important.64 The courts have only found a law to fail 
this stage of the test on very few occasions.65 In the inquiry into the "least 
drastic means", a margin of appreciation is afforded the legislature because it 
will almost always be possible to imagine an approach that might limit the right 
to a lesser degree. The majority of the Supreme Court recognised the difficulties 
of applying the "least drastic means" requirement of the Oakes test in R v 
Edwards Books and Art, importing the word "reasonable" into this part of the 
test and asking whether the law limited the right "as little as is reasonably 
possible".66 
C The Principle of Proportionality in Other Jurisdictions 
The principle of proportionality is used in various other jurisdictions, 
such as South Africa, Lesotho and Zambia, as part of the test to determine the 
constitutionality of limitations on constitutionally protected rights and 
freedoms. In the Republic of South Africa section 36(1) of the constitution 
requires the principle of proportionality to be considered in determining whether 
limits to rights in the Bill of Rights are constitutional.67 The constitution of 
63 Ross v New Bru11swick School District No. 15 [1996) 62 ACWS (3d) 266, para 34 (SCC). 
64 Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (4 ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1997) 879 - 889. 
65 For example, R v Big M Drug Mart [1985) l SCR 295 (SCC); R v Zundel [1992) 2 SCR 731 
(SCC); Hogg, above, 884 - 887 . 
66 R v Edwards Books and Art [1986) 2 SCR 713, 772 Dickson CJ (Chouinard and Le Dain JJ 
concurring) (SCC); Hogg, above, 894 - 895. 
61 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and A11other v Minister of Justice and 
Others [ 1998) 3 LRC 648, 674 - 675 (SACC). S 36( 1): "The rights in the Bill of Rights may be 
limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable 
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Lesotho does not have a specific limitations prov1s10n, so the courts have 
adopted the Oakes68 test from Canada to determine whether limitations to 
constitutionally protected rights and freedoms are constitutional.69 In Zambia 
the proportionality test is used to determine whether limitations are "reasonably 
required" and therefore constitutionaI.70 
D The United Kingdom and the Human Rights Act 1998: Incorporating 
the Principle of Proportionality 
1 Proportionality and judicial review prior to the entry into force of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 
Prior to the entry into force of the Human Rights Act on 2 October 2000, 
proportionality had not emerged as an independent head of review in the United 
Kingdom. Instead the courts in the United Kingdom developed a higher 
intensity of review to try to give weight to fundamental human rights and 
freedoms, developed in ex parte Smith. 71 It is important to consider this 
approach because in New Zealand there is recognition that the intensity of 
review varies with the facts of the case, an approach that could accord with the 
ex parte Smith approach. In part IV it will be considered whether such an 
approach would be consistent with the requirements of the Bill of Rights and 
able to act as a substitute for the development of proportionality as a separate 
ground of review. 
(a) Intensity of review 
Faced with the inability to give effect to human rights with direct 
reference to the Convention, due to failure to incorporate the Convention into 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all the relevant factors, including - (a) the nature of the right; (b) the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the 
relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
£urpose". 
8 R v Oakes [1986] l SCR 103, 138-139 (SCC). 
69 Attorney General v 'Mopa [2003] l LRC 224,236 para 33 (Lesotho CA). 
70 M'membe and Another v The People [ 1996] 2 LRC 280, 287 (Zambia SC). 
71 R v Ministry of Defe11ce, ex pa rte Smith [ 1996] QB 517 . 
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United Kingdom Jaw, the courts developed the concept of intensity of review as 
a means of giving some priority to human rights norms. The intensity of review 
increases with the gravity of the issue which the decision being reviewed 
determines. In Budaycay72 the need for a higher intensity of review was noted, 
subject to the limitations that normally restrict interference by a court on judicial 
review.73 
This approach of a higher intensity of review in cases where fundamental 
human rights were at issue was confirmed by Brind74 and ex parte Smith.75 The 
position from Budaycay and Brind was summarised in ex parte Smith where the 
judges of the Court of Appeal accepted counsel for the applicant's submission 
on the correct approach to the issue of irrationality: 76 
The court may not interfere with the exercise of an administrative discretion on 
substantive grounds save where the court is satisfied that the decision is 
unreasonable in the sense that it is beyond the range of responses open to a 
reasonable decision-maker. But in judging whether the decision-maker has 
exceeded this margin of appreciation the human rights context is important. The 
more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the court will 
require by way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is 
reasonable in the sense outlined above. 
This has been called a sub-Wednesbury approach,77 contrasted with the 
traditional Wednesbur/ 8 approach and the super-Wednesbury approach that 
requires the extra element of bad faith, improper motive, or manifest absurdity 
in order to be Wednesbury reviewable.79 It would seem implicit in the ex parte 
72 R v Home Secretary, ex parte Budaycay [1987] l AC 514. 
73 R v Home Secretary, ex parte Budaycay, above, 531 Lord Bridge of Harwich: " ... the court 
must, I think, be entitled to subject an administrative decision to the more rigorous examination, 
to ensure that it is no way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue which the decision 
determines . The most fundamental of all human rights is the individual's right to life and when 
an administrative decision under challenge is said to be one which may put the applicant's life at 
risk, the basis of the decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny." The other judges 
all concurred with Lord Bridge' s analysis : 534 Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, 537 Lord 
Templeman, 538 Lord Griffiths , 538 Lord Goff of Chievely. 
74 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [ 1991] 1 AC 696, 748 - 749 
Lord Bridge of Harwich (HL(E)) . 
75 R v Minist,y of Defence, ex parte S111ith [ 1996] QB 517 (CA). 
76 R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte S111ith [ 1996] QB 517, 554 - 555 Sir Thomas Bingham MR, 
563 Henry LJ (CA). 
77 Martin Norris "Ex Parte Smith : Irrationality and Human Rights" (1996) PL 590,594. 78 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 . 
79 R v Secretary of State for the Enviro11111ent, ex parte Hammersmith and Fulham London 
Borough Council [ 1991] l AC 521, 597 (HL(E)); discussed in R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte 
Smith [ 1996] QB 517, 535 - 536 Simon Brown LJ (DC) . 
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Smjth approach that the threshold is indeed lowered,80 although there seems to 
be some uncertainty arising from the decisions relied upon by the court in ex 
parte Smith. Prior to the Court of Appeal's analysis in ex parte Smith, the 
reasoning in Brind and Budaycay alone was not held to be enough to establish 
the lowering of the threshold of unreasonableness. 81 This was an approach 
followed by the Divisional Court in the ex parte Smith case where it was held 
that the higher intensity of review or increased scrutiny test did not involve a 
lowering of the threshold of unreasonableness. 82 If the threshold is not lowered, 
the question is raised of what the increased scrutiny actually achieves in 
protecting human rights norms, as the decision will be the same in any event. 
This point was not addressed directly by the Court of Appeal in ex parte Smith. 
Ex parte Smith was applied in a number of subsequent cases. In 
Canbolat83 the applicant failed in a challenge to a decision to return her to 
France on the grounds that France was not a safe third country where her asylum 
application would be heard in accordance with the relevant international 
Conventions. The Court of Appeal expressly endorsed the ex parte Smith 
formulation of the unreasonableness test to be used. 84 At issue in the case was 
evidence that while France did comply with the international conventions once a 
person was within the relevant domestic process, French officials had in a 
number of cases improperly and unlawfully excluded asylum seekers from the 
process and initiated their deportation without their asylum claims being 
considered. 85 The Court concluded that even though there was no indication that 
80 Norris, above, 594. 
81 R v Secreta,y of State for the Environment, ex parte National and Local Govemment Officers 
Association (1992) 5 Admin LR 785, 797 - 798 Neill LJ (CA). 
82 R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517, 537 - 538 Simon Brown LJ (DC): 
"Rather they emphasise that within the limited scope of review open to it the court must be 
scrupulous to ensure that no recognised ground of challenge is in truth available to the applicants 
before rejecting his application. When the most fundamental human rights are threatened, the 
court will not, for example, be inclined to overlook some perhaps minor flaw in the decision 
making process, or adopt a particularly benevolent view of the minister's evidence, or exercise 
its discretion to withhold relief... In short. .. even where fundamental human rights are being 
restricted, "the threshold of unreasonableness" is not lowered. On the other hand, the minister 
on judicial review will need to show that there is an important competing public interest which 
he could reasonably judge sufficient to justify the restriction and he must expect his reasons to 
be closely scrutinised. Even that approach, therefore, involves a more intensive review process 
and a greater readiness to interfere than would ordinarily characterise a judicial review 
challenge" [emphasis added]. 
83 R v Secretary of Sate for the Home Department, ex parte Canbolat [ 1997] l WLR 1569 (CA). 
84 Canbolat, above, 1579. 
85 Canbolat, above, 1580. 
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the Secretary of State had considered the evidence of France's failures put to 
him by the applicant, and even though in future the Secretary of State would 
have to consider this evidence, the Secretary of State's decision passed the 
anxious scrutiny test. 86 This approach does not seem to conform in practice to 
the ex parte Smith approach that the Court says it is using. Far from requiring 
more by way of justification from the decision maker the Court has deferred to 
the decision despite not knowing whether the Secretary of State had considered 
evidence that he should have had regard to, and must have regard to in future 
decisions! 
The approach in R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A87 by contrast 
1s a more robust approach. The Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the 
Bloody Sunday Inquiry Tribunal to refuse to give anonymity to soldiers giving 
evidence before it who had fired their weapons in the massacre, and went on to 
say that they did not consider that "any decision was possible other than to grant 
the anonymity to the soldiers". 88 The Court endorsed the ex parte Smith 
approach, 89 and in reviewing the Tribunal's decision conducted a thorough 
review of the me1its of the decision. The Court questioned, among other things, 
the weight attached to considerations of an open search for the truth as opposed 
to the risk and perceived 1isk to the soldiers, and the validity of the Tribunal's 
reasoning that suppressing the witnesses' names would undermine the openness 
of the proceedings.90 The Court makes the qualification that they had come to 
their decision "not primarily because of the points of criticism ... [t]hose 
criticisms would not in our judgement in themselves entitle the court to 
interfere". 91 Instead the Court held that the Tribunal had used the wrong 
approach to the question, which did not "accord to the applicants fundamental 
86 Ca11bolat, above, 1581: "The evidence on behalf of the Secretary of State does not specifically 
deal with this report. We do not know what weight the Secretary of State attaches to it. We 
would have been assisted by knowing his approach to this material. However it may well be that 
when he reached his decision, there was no more than a summary in English available to him. 
The position is not clear. We would have thought however that this is material to which he 
certainly should have regard if it was available when he granted a certificate and which we 
would expect him to co1111ne11t 011 i11f11ture" [emphasis added]. 
87 R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A [2000] l WLR 1855 (CA). The soldiers wanted 
their names to be protected, but were prepared to testify publicly in the course of the Tribunal's 
riroceedings. 
8 R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A, above, 1878. 
89 R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex pa rte A, above, 1866 - 1867. 
90 R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex pa rte A, above, 1871 - 1878. 
91 R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A, above, 1875 . 
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rights the required weight" and had failed to analyse the extent to which the 
granting of anonymity would compromise the public and open nature of the 
proceedings.92 In contrast to Canbolat93 the Court examined the merits and the 
eventual decision was, despite claims to the, contrary clearly merits based. The 
threshold of unreasonableness was clearly lower than the usual Wednesbury 
standard.94 
Mahmood95 was decided after the entry into force of the Human Rights 
Act but considered a decision that was made prior to its entry into force. 96 The 
Court of Appeal declined to decide the case under the Human Rights Act. 97 The 
majority of the Court followed the ex parte Smith approach, holding that the 
approach was "a settled principle of the common law".98 The Court held that it 
was necessary to grant a margin of appreciation to the decision maker in order to 
maintain " . . . a principled distance between the court's adjudication in a case 
such as this and the Secretary of State's decision, based on his perception of the 
case's merits".99 
This increased scrutiny review is of relevance as the New Zealand courts 
take a similar approach. While not explicitly adopting the ex parte Smith 
approach the courts raise or lower the Wednesbury threshold depending on the 
context of the case, 100 with some recognition that where human rights are at 
issue a "hard look" might be appropriate. 101 The increased scrutiny review 
provides a questionable degree of effective protection to human rights. The ex 
parte Smith approach will not meet required international standards for an 
effective remedy because, as the ECHR's rejection of the judicial review in ex 
92 R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A, above, 1870 - 1871. 
93 R v Secretary of Sate for the Home Department, ex parte Canbolat [1997] l WLR 1569 (CA). 
94 It is hard to see how they could have concluded that there was only one possible decision that 
could be reached unless the analysis and decision was on the merits. 
95 R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001) l WLR 840 (CA). 
96 The decision to deport Mahmood was taken on 29 September 1999, the Human Rights Act 
entered into force on 2 October 2000, and the case was heard on 10 October 2000. 
91 R ( Mahmood) v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department, above, 851 - 853 paras 27 - 29 
Laws LJ, 855 para 35 May LJ. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR disagreed on this point, 
taking the view that the court should approach the case as if the Act was in force at the time the 
decision was taken , but reached the same result in any event. 
98 R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, 847 para 18 Laws LJ . 
99 R ( Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above, 854 - 855 para 33 Laws 
LJ. 
100 Electoral Commission v Ca111eron [1997] 2 NZLR 421 , 433 (CA); Wellington City Council v 
Woolworths ( No 2) [ 1996) 2 NZLR 537, 552 (CA). 
101 Pharmaceutical Managernent Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd [1998) NZAR 
58, 66 (CA). 
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parte Smith as an effective remedy showed, 102 it still does not allow a court to 
analyse the complaint and found its decision on the required criteria. The 
required criteria are, for many of the rights and freedoms, those incorporated in 
the p1inciple of proportionality. 
(b) Proportionality before the Human Rights Act 1998 
Prior to the entry into force of the Human Rights Act in the United 
Kingdom proportionality had not emerged as an independent head of review. 103 
Lord Diplock raised the possibility that proportionality might eventually emerge 
as a separate head of review as early as 1985 in the CCSU104 case. After 
classifying the three main grounds of judicial review as illegality, irrationality 
and procedural impropriety, he added "That is not to say that further 
developments ... may not in the course of time add further grounds... I have in 
mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 
'proportionality' ,, 105 The courts dealt with submissions relating to 
proportionality as a separate head of review over the following years, without 
taking the step of accepting the development, until the entry into force of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 provided the basis for the adoption of proportionality in 
Daly.106 
Proportionality was advanced as a ground for judicial review in Brind. 107 
The existence of proportionality as a ground of review was rejected both by the 
102 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493 . 
103 The courts had been obliged under section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 to 
apply the principle of proportionality to" . . . administrative decisions that fall under the rubric of 
community law": Gareth Wong "Towards the Nutcracker Principle: Reconsidering the 
Objections to Proportionality" (2000) PL 92, 95; Nicholas Green "Proportionality and the 
Supremacy of Parliament in the UK" in Evelyn Ellis (ed) Th e Principle of Proportionality in the 
Laws of Europe (Hart, Oxford, 1999), 145 ; Jonathan L Back-Branch "Parliamentary Supremacy 
or Political Expediency?: The Constitutional Position of the Human Rights Act under British 
Law" (2002) 23 Statute Law Review 59, 77-79. 
104 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of State for the Civil Service [ 1985) AC 374 
(HL(E)). 
105 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of State for the Civil Service [1985) AC 374,410 
Lord Diplock (HL(E)). 
106 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001) 3 All ER 433. 
107 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex pa rte Brind [ 1991) l AC 696. Judicial 
review was sought of the Secretary of State's directives issued to the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), restricting their direct 
broadcast of the words spoken by members of proscribed organisations in Northern Ireland 
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Court of Appeal 108 and the House of Lords. 109 In the Court of Appeal two of the 
three judges saw proportionality merely as an aspect of the irrationality ground 
of review, on the basis that a decision with a total lack of proportionality would 
be unreasonable on application of the Wednesbury test. 110 In the House of Lords, 
Lord Ackner correctly distinguished the proportionality argument advanced by 
the appellants from this Wednesbury application of a concept of 
. 1· 111 proport10na 1ty: 
This is not a repetition of the Wednesbury "irrational test" under another 
guise. Clearly a decision by a minister which suffers from a total lack of 
proportionality will qualify for the Wednesbury unreasonable epithet. It is, ex 
hypothesi, a decision which no reasonable minister could make. This is, 
however, a different and severer test. Mr Lester is asking your lordships to 
adopt a different principle - the principle of "proportionality" which is 
recognised in the administrative law of several members of the European 
Economic Community. 
The House of Lords declined to adopt proportionality on the grounds that it 
represented a shift to merits review that was constitutionally unjustified, 112 
qualified in Lord Ackner's case by the proviso "unless and until Parliament 
incorporates the Convention into domestic law" 113• The distinction between 
manifest disproportionality in the Wednesbury sense and the principle of 
proportionality is an important one to bear in mind; the latter clearly goes further 
than a Wednesbury proportionality approach. 114 
In R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith 115 both the Divisional Court 
and the Court of Appeal accepted that the Convention would have to be 
incorporated before the policy at issue could be reviewed on proportionality 
108 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind, above, 722 - 723 Lord 
Donaldson of Lymington MR, 729 McCowan LJ (CA). 
109 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind, above, 749 Lord Bridge of 
Harwich, 750 Lord Roskill, 
110 R v Secretary of State for the Ho111e Department, ex parte Brind, above, 722 - 723 Lord 
Donaldson of Lymington MR, 729 McCowan LJ (CA). 
111 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind, above, 762 Lord Ackner 
(HL(E)). 
112 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [ 1991] l AC 696, 749 Lord 
Bridge of Harwich, 750 Lord Roskill, 762 - 763 Lord Ackner (HL(E)). 
113 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind, above, 762 - 763 Lord 
Ackner (HL(E)). 
114 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind, above, 766 - 767 Lord 
Lowry (HL(E)); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly (2001] 3 All ER 
433, 446 Lord Steyn (HL(E)). 
115 R vMinist,yofDefence, exparteSmith (1996] QB 517. 
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grounds. 116 At the Divisional Court Simon Brown LJ made powerful remarks to 
the effect that though the policy survived scrutiny under the irrationality ground 
of review it would be unlikely to survive a challenge to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 117 However, the other judge at the Divisional Court disagreed 
with these remarks 11 8 and the Court of Appeal felt that since the Convention was 
not a part of domestic law it was "unhelpful" for the courts to consider what 
might happen at Strasbourg. 119 The applicants in the case did in fact succeed at 
the European Court of Human Rights, who held not only that the policy was a 
violation of the applicant's rights under Article 8 of the Convention, 120 but also 
that the failure of the Courts in the United Kingdom to apply the proportionality 
test had led to a breach of the right to an effective remedy under Article 13. 121 
The relevance of this latter finding to judicial review under the Bill of Rights 
will be discussed more fully below in part IV(A) of this paper. 
2 Proportionality and judicial review after the entry into force of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 
With the entry into force of the Human Rights Act on 2 October 2000, 
proportionality rapidly emerged as an independent head of review where a 
Convention right was at issue. That result was inevitable following the ECHR 
decision in Smith and Grady, 122 and was necessary to meet the United 
Kingdom's international obligations. The inability of the courts in the United 
Kingdom to consider the proportionality of limits to Convention rights in the 
context of judicial review inevitably rendered the courts unable to grant an 
effective remedy in some cases. The adequacy of judicial review on Wednesbury 
grounds as a remedy under the Convention and the ICCPR is discussed below in 
116 R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, above, 536, 541 - 542 Simon Brown LJ (DC), 558 -
559 Sir Thomas Bingham MR, 564 Henry LJ (CA). There was another ground on which 
proportionality could have been argued, that of EC Law and the effect of the European 
Communities Act 1972 through a European Council directive. Both the Divisional Court and the 
Court of Appeal held that the Directive did not apply. The issue of proportionality and its 
application with respect to EC law is not within the scope of this paper. 
11 7 R v Ministry of Def ence, ex parte S11tith, above, 541 - 542 Simon Brown LJ (DC) . 
11 8 R v Ministry of Defen ce, ex parte S111ith, above, 546 Curtis J (DC) . 
119 R v Ministry of Def ence, ex parte S11tith , above, 517 , 558 - 559 Sir Thomas Bingham MR, 
564 Henry LJ (CA). 
120 Smith and Grady v United Kingdo11t (1999) 29 EHRR 493, 529 - 537 paras 87 - 112. 
121 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom, above, 540 - 544 paras 129 - 139. 
122 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493 . 
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part IV(A). The House of Lords, for their part, were quite clear that even the 
heightened intensity of review in ex parte Smith 123 was insufficient to meet 
obligations under the Human Rights Act. 124 
The step was taken by the House of Lords in R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, ex parte Daly (Daly) 125 on 23 May 2001, remarkably 
little time having elapsed since the entry into force of the Human Rights Act. In 
Daly the House of Lords adopted the three-stage test from de Freitas: 126 
... the court should ask itself. .. whether: (i) the legislative objective is 
sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures 
designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and 
(iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective." 
The ECHR decision in Smith and Grady had dispelled the view that the 
traditional standards of review and the higher standards of review "under the 
convention or the common law of human rights ... are substantially the same.',1 27 
Proportionality review might require "the reviewing court to assess the balance 
which the decision maker has struck ... [and] it may require attention to be 
directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations". 128 
In R v Shayler129, following the decision in Daly, Lord Bingham of 
Comhill emphasised that " ... in any application for judicial review alleging an 
alleged violation of a Convention right the court will now conduct a more 
123 R v Minist,y of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517 (CA). 
124 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433, 446 -
447 paras 27 - 28 Lord Steyn, 447 para 32 Lord Cooke of Thorndon (HL(E)). 
125 R v Secretary of State for the Home Depart111e11t, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433 (HL(E)). 
Prior to Daly the Privy Council had considered limits to a Convention right with respect to 
Scotland on 5 December 2000 in Brown v Stott [2003] l AC 681, as under the devolution 
legislation the Convention was considered to be in force in Scotland. The right in question was 
the right against self-incrimination, which was implied within art 6 of the Convention (Murray v 
U11ited Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29, 60 - 61 para 45). The court did not use the principle of 
proportionality, but did consider whether the limitation in question was proportional (the last 
limb of the principle of proportionality). 
126 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly, above, para 27 Lord Steyn 
(HL(E)), approving the three stage test used by the Privy Council in de Freitas v Permanent 
Secretary of Mi11istry of Agriculture, Fisheries, La11ds a11d Housing [1999] l AC 69, 80 Lord 
Clyde (PC). 
127 R v Secreta,y of State for the Ho111e Department, ex parte Daly , above, 447 para 32 Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon. 
128 R v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly, above, 446 para 27 Lord 
Steyn. 
129 R v Shayler [2003] l AC 247 (HL(E)) . 
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rigorous and intrusive review than was once thought to be permissible" 130 
[emphasis added]. Lord Hope of Craighead held that: 131 
The principle involves a question of balance between competing interests . 
But it is important to appreciate that there is a process of analysis that must 
be carried through. The starting point is that an authority which seeks to 
justify a restriction on a fundamental right on the ground of a pressing 
social need has a burden to discharge. There is a burden on the state to show 
that the legislative means adopted were no greater than necessary ... As 
these propositions indicate, it is not enough to assert that the decision that 
was taken was a reasonable one. A close and penetrating examination of the 
factual justification for the restriction is needed if the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Convention are to remain practical and effective for 
everyone who wishes to exercise them". 
Lord Hope later emphasised both that the intensity of review under a 
proportionality review is greater than that under the Wednesbury approach, and 
that "[i]t is, above all, important that cases involving Convention rights are 
analysed in the right way" [emphasis added]. 132 
The issue of the margin of appreciation was addressed in Farrakhan. 133 
The decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department to exclude Mr 
Farrakhan from the United Kingdom was challenged on the grounds that his 
exclusion, which was intended to rest1ict his freedom of expression by 
preventing him airing his controversial views, engaged article 10 of the 
Convention, and that the decision was a disproportionate interference. The judge 
at first instance approached the case on the basis that with a Convention right at 
issue "the terms of the Secretary of State's decision had to demonstrate that he 
had properly found and identified 'substantial and objective justification' for his 
decision", 134 a burden the judge held was not met. The Court of Appeal 
disagreed on the approach, emphasising that the margin of appreciation 
accorded to a decision maker had to be properly identified. The Wednesbury test 
130 R v Slzayler, above, 272 para 33 Lord Bingham ofCornhill. 
131 R v Shay/er, above, 281 paras 59 and 61 Lord Hope of Craighead. 
132 R v Shay/er, above, 285 para 75 Lord Hope of Craighead; R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Depart111ent, ex parte Daly (2001] 3 All ER 433, 446 para 28 Lord Steyn (HL(E)): "The 
difference in approach between the traditional grounds of review and the proportionality 
approach may therefore sometimes yield different results . It is therefore important that cases 
involving convention rights must be analysed in the correct way". . 
133 R ( Farrakha11) v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department (2002] EWCA Civ 606; (2002] 
QB 1391 (CA). 
134 R ( Farrakha11) v Secretary of State for th e Ho111e Department, above, para 31. 
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"left a very wide margin of appreciation to the decision maker. .. [i]ndeed, the 
margin was far too wide to accommodate the demands of the Convention". 135 
The Court held that in determining whether a limitation on a Convention right is 
justified the doctrine of proportionality must be applied. When applying the 
proportionality test the width of the margin of appreciation given to the decision 
maker will vary, depending on the right at issue and the facts of the case, and 
" ... the margin of appreciation or discretion accorded to the decision maker is 
all-important, for it is only by recognising the margin of discretion that the court 
avoids substituting its own decision for that of the decision maker". 136 In the 
Farrakhan case the Court of Appeal cited several factors that supported a wide 
margin of appreciation, and concluded that the decision was not a 
disproportionate limitation on the freedom of expression rights under article 10 
of the Convention. 137 The importance of this approach will be considered below 
in Part V(B), in considering the question whether the proportionality head of 
review represents a shift to merits review. 
The proportionality cases emphasise several propositions: 
(1) The intensity of review under a proportionality review is greater 
than under the traditional Wednesbury review, and also greater 
than under the ex parte Smith "anxious scrutiny" Wednesbury 
approach. 
(2) The method of analysis is important as proportionality review 
and traditional review grounds may yield different results . 
(3) The burden is on the authority seeking to justify a limitation on a 
right , and the facts said to support that justification must be given 
a close and penetrating examination. 
(4) The margin of appreciation granted to the decision maker 
preserves the nature of the exercise as a review. 
(5) The margin of appreciation afforded to the decision maker is 
narrower than that used in the traditional Wednesbury test, and 
will vary with the facts and context of the case. Correctly 
135 R ( Farrakhan) v Secretary of State f or the Ho!lle Department, above, paras 64 - 65 . 
136 R ( Farrakhan) v Secretary of State f or the Hollle Department, above, paras 64 - 65 . 
137 R ( Farrakhan) v Secretary of State f or the Home Department, above, paras 71 - 79. 
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identifying and applying the correct margin of appreciation is a 
vital part of a proportionality review. 
IV THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 AND 
PROPORTIONALITY 
A New Zealand's International Obligations 
I The Bill of Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
New Zealand ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (the ICCPR) on 28 December 1978. 138 As a state party to the ICCPR 
New Zealand has an obligation at international law to perform its obligations in 
good faith. 139 In interpreting the Bill of Rights, regard should be had to New 
Zealand's international obligations, as there is a presumption that Parliament 
would not legislate in a manner inconsistent with those international 
obligations. 140 This presumption has been expressly approved by the Court of 
Appeal. Richardson Jin Ashby v Minister of Immigration noted that "it has been 
increasingly recognised in recent years that, even though treaty obligations not 
implemented by legislation are not part of our domestic law, the Courts in 
interpreting legislation will do their best conformably with the subject-matter 
and the policy of the legislation to see that their decisions are consistent with our 
international obligations". 141 This general presumption of statutory 
interpretation is strengthened in the case of the Bill of Rights by its purpose to 
138 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171; 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Status of Ratifications of the 
Principal International Human Rights Treaties as of 7 July 2003 <http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/ 
refort.pdf> (last accessed 15 July 2003). 
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331, art 26. 
140 Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1983] 2 AC 751,771 Lord Diplock (HL): " ... it is a 
principle of construction of United Kingdom statutes, now too well established to call for 
citation of authority, that the words of a statute passed after a treaty has been signed and dealing 
with the subject matter of the international obligation of the United Kingdom, are to be 
construed, if they are reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning, as intended to carry out the 
obligation and not be inconsistent with it". 
141 Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] l NZLR 222, 229 Richardson J, also noted by 
Somers J at 232. See also New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Association Inc v Attorney-General 
[1997] 3 NZLR 269,289 (CA). 
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affirm New Zealand's obligations under the ICCPR. 142 That the Bill of Rights 
was intended to incorporate international standards is also supported by the 
Prime Minister's comments in moving the Bill's second reading, to the effect 
that New Zealand has " ... ratified many conventions on human rights; we have 
accepted many international obligations in that regard; and those international 
standards should now be incorporated visibly and plainly into New Zealand 
domestic law" [emphasis added]. 143 That the Bill of Rights incorporates New 
Zealand's international obligations was also recognised by the Government in 
its fourth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee. 144 
The meaning of an enactment is to be "ascertained from the text in light 
of its purpose" 145 and the long title of the enactment is a matter that may be 
considered to ascertain the meaning. 146 The long title makes it clear that the Bill 
of Rights was enacted in order to "affirm" New Zealand's commitment to the 
ICCPR. 147 In King-Ansell v Police 148 a reference in the long title of the Race 
Relations Act 1971 to the Act's purpose to implement the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was 
important in the outcome of the case. 149 Woodhouse J noted that" ... the express 
mention in the Act of its intention to implement the Convention demonstrates, if 
142 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title. 
143 Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer (14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3451. 
144 Human Rights Committee Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant: Fourth Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 1995: New Zealand 
(14 May 2001) CCPR/C/NZL/2001/4, para 40: "The Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights 
Act 1993 are designed to implement New Zealand's international obligations. Therefore, the 
judicial interpretation or application of those Acts will involve references to the relevant 
international conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" 
[emphasis added]. 
145 Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1). 
146 Interpretation Act 1999, ss 5(2) and 5(3). 
147 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Long Title. 
148 King-Ansell v Police [ 1979] 2 NZLR 531 (CA). 
149 King-Ansell v Police, above, 536 - 537 Woodhouse J, 540 - 541 Richardson J. This case 
concerned the appeal by a member of the New Zealand National Socialist Party against his 
conviction under s 25(1) of the Race Relations Act 1977 for distributing anti-Semitic pamphlets 
with the "intent to excite ill-will against a group of persons in New Zealand, namely Jews, on 
the ground of their ethnic origins". It was argued Jews were not an "ethnic" group. The reference 
to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was 
important in indicating that the meaning of "ethnic" had to be given a meaning commensurate 
with the english version of the Convention, and therefore the meaning "ethnic" would have in 
english internationally. That allowed "ethnic" to be given a broad meaning that would include 
Jews as an "ethnic" group. 
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that were necessary, that the language of the Act is intended to adopt and reflect 
its purposes". 150 
The Courts have recognised the importance of the ICCPR and New 
Zealand's obligations under the ICCPR to the application of the Bill of 
Rights: 151 
In approaching the Bill of Rights Act it must be of cardinal importance to 
bear in mind the antecedents. The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights speaks of inalienable rights derived from the inherent 
dignity of the human person. Internationally there is now general 
recognition that some human rights are fundamental and anterior to any 
municipal law, although municipal law may fall short of giving effect to 
them. .. Subject to contrary requirements in any legislation, the New 
Zealand Courts must now, in my opinion, give it practical effect irrespective 
of the state of our law before the Bill of Rights Act. [emphasis added] 
The relationship of the Bill of Rights and the ICCPR was also considered 
in Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent's Case}. 152 In that case the long title 
affirmation of New Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR and the obligation to 
provide an effective remedy for violation of any of the protected rights and 
freedoms that New Zealand had accepted under the ICCPR 153 were important in 
the reasoning of the majority of the Court of Appeal in holding that there was a 
public cause of action for damages under the Bill of Rights Act. 154 Hardie Boys 
J noted that he would be " ... most reluctant to conclude that the Act, which 
purports to affirm this commitment [to an effective remedy under article 2(3)], 
should be construed other than in a manner that gives effect to it". 155 In Tavita v 
Minister of Immigration 156 the Court of Appeal saw as "unattractive" an 
argument that the Minister in the exercise of a discretion might be entitled to 
ignore international human 1ights instruments that have not been incorporated 
into New Zealand law, as such an argument implied "New Zealand's 
15° Ki11g-Ansell v Police, above, 536. 
151 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 270 Cooke P (CA). 
152 Simpson v Attorney-General {Baigent 's Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
153 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, art 
2(3). 
154 Baige11t's Case, above, 676 Cooke P , 690 - 691 Casey J, 699 Hardie Boys J, 718 McKay J, 
Gault J dissenting. 
155 Baige11t 's Case, above, 699 Hardie Boys J. 
156 Tavita v Minister of /111111igratio11 [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA). 
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adherence ... has been at least partly window dressing".
157 To argue that the 
courts, bound by section 3 of the Bill of Rights to act consistently with it, are not 
required to interpret the Bill of Rights consistently with the underlying 
international obligations that it affirms, would be an equally unattractive 
argument. 
The Hong Kong Court of Appeal commented, with reference to the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991, that " ... the glass through which we 
view the interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill is a glass provided by the 
Covenant". 158 The Hong Kong Bill of Rights was intended to give effect to 
Hong Kong's obligations under the ICCPR, a point made more explicitly than in 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights. 159 However, both the Hong Kong and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights have the ICCPR, and the obligations under that treaty, 
underlying their enactment and the metaphor of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal 
is applicable to the New Zealand Bill of Rights. The starting point under the Bill 
of Rights should be the international obligations that it affirms, and was 
intended to implement. 160 The interpretation of the Bill of Rights should, 
therefore, be viewed through the "glass" of the ICCPR and New Zealand's 
commitments under it. Where there is ambiguity in the interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights the interpretation that is consistent with New Zealand's international 
obligations under the ICCPR is to be preferred. 161 
There are two main elements of New Zealand's international obligations 
that are of interest for this paper: the obligations with respect to the limitation of 
rights and freedoms and the obligation to provide an effective remedy for 
violations of rights and freedoms. 
157 Tavita, above, 265 - 266. Hardie Boys J in Baigent's Case warns against considering the Bill 
of Rights as "window dressing": Baigent's Case, above, 691. 
158 R v Sin Yau-ming (1992] LRC (Const) 547,561 Silke V-P. 
159 Hong Kong became a party to the ICCPR through the United Kingdom's ratification in 1976, 
R v Sin Yau-ming, above, 558. The Hong Kong Bill of Rights is stronger than the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights in this respect, with inconsistent pre-existing legislation repealed by virtue of s 3, 
and with s 2(3) explicitly noting that the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to incorporate the 
ICCPR into Hong Kong law: R v Sin Yau-ming, above, 558 - 559. 
160 Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer ( 14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3451. 
161 The Canadian and United Kingdom approaches are relevant, and should be considered. 
However, the Bill of Rights is intended to "affirm" New Zealand's obligations under the ICCPR 
(New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title) and if the Canadian or United Kingdom 
approaches diverge from the requirements of New Zealand's international obligations under the 
ICCPR it is the international obligations that should be followed. 
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2 Limitation of rights 
Rights and freedoms are generally not absolute in nature
162 and 
international human rights treaties have recognised that there can be limitations 
to individual's rights based on the countervailing rights of others or certain 
important social goals. As discussed in part III of this paper the ECHR has used 
the principle of proportionality as the test for whether limitations to Convention 
rights are "necessary in a democratic society" and therefore justified under the 
Convention. The Convention shares a number of similarities with the ICCPR in 
its text and the jurisprudence of the ECHR can provide persuasive authority for 
determining New Zealand's obligations under the ICCPR. The starting point for 
discussion however must be the ICCPR. 
The ICCPR does not contain a general limitations provision, instead the 
permjssible limitations for each of the rights and freedoms guaranteed is 
contained within the article specifying the right. So, for example, restrictions on 
the right of peaceable assembly must be "in conformity with the law" and 
"necessary in a democratic society" for the purposes of " ... national security, 
public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others". 163 Some rights have no allowable limitations, 
such as the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 164 The table below indicates the rights and freedoms that have 
limitations provisions linked to a set of specified allowable purposes for any 
limitation: 
162 Some are absolute, including the right not to be subjected to torture . 
163 ICCPR, above, art 21. 
164 ICCPR, above, art 7. 
ICCPR 
Art 
Art 12(3) 
Art 18(3) 
Art 19(3) 
Art 21 
Art 22(2) 
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Right/Freedom 
Liberty of movement and freedom to 
choose residence 
Freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion 
Freedom of expression 
Right of peaceable assembly 
Freedom of association 
Limitation Requirements 
"provided by law" 
"necessary" for the specified 
purposes 165 
"prescribed by law" 
"necessary" for the specified 
purposes 166 
"provided by law" 
"necessary for the specified 
purposes 167 
"imposed in conformity with 
the law" 
"necessary in a democratic 
society" for the specified 
purposes 168 
"prescribed by law" 
"necessary in a democratic 
society" for the specified 
purposes 169 
The necessity element in each case incorporates the requirement that restriction 
must be proportional. 170 "The principle of proportionality requires that the type 
and intensity of any interference be absolutely necessary to attain a purpose."
171 
Those rights requiring limitations to be necessary in a democratic society 
impose a further obligation that limitations conform to a " ... common, minimum 
democratic standarrl'. 172 Nowak suggests that the criteria of "pluralism, 
165 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 
[ICCPR], art 12(3): national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of others. Limits must also be consistent with the other rights recognised in 
the ICCPR. 
166 ICCPR, above, art 18(3) : public safety, order, health , or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others. 
167 ICCPR, above, art 19(3): respect of the rights or reputations of others, to protect national 
security, public order (ordre public), public health, morals. 
168 ICCPR, above, art 21: national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
169 ICCPR, above, art 22(2): national security or public safety, public order (ordre public) , the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
170 Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel, 
Arlington (Va), 1993), 211 art 12, 325 art 18, 351 - 352 art 19, 378 - 379 art 21, 394 art 22. 
This paper is not concerned with the "prescribed" or "provided" by law limb of the limitation 
prov1s1ons. 
171 Nowak, above, 379. 
172 Nowak, above, 379. 
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tolerance and broadmindedness" 173 adopted by the ECHR in the Handyside 
case 174 are valid minimum standards to consider in this context. 
The absence of a general limiting provision in other rights of the ICCPR 
does not mean they are absolute. The permissible restrictions are narrowly 
specified within the right. The article 8 right not to be required to perform forced 
or compulsory labour175 does not include hard labour performed as part of a 
sentence imposed by a court176 or further specified exceptions. 
177 In the case of 
other rights some limitations are implicit in the right, even where the text 
contains no specific or general limitation provision. The right to marry
178 is one 
example, while it has no general or specific limitation in the text, other than the 
parties are "of marriageable age", there are some limitations implicit in the right, 
though narrow and limited to "those obstacles and prohibitions of marriage 
generally recognised by the States Parties". 179 
It should also be noted that the Human Rights Committee has expressly 
rejected the "margin of appreciation" doctrine used by the ECHR in its 
consideration of communications made under the First Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR. 180 Whether this has any implications to a domestic margin of 
appreciation doctrine will be considered below in Part V(C). 
The Bill of Rights approaches the question of justified limitations to the 
rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill of Rights with a single applicable 
limitations provision. The approach to limitations in section 5 of the Bill of 
Rights imposes one general test for determining the lawfulness of limitations; 
limitations are to be reasonable, prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society. Proportionality is the test required under the 
173 Nowak, above, 379. 
174 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, 754 para 49; See also Young, James and 
Webster v The United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 38, para 63. 
175 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 
[ICCPR], art 8(3)(a). 
176 ICCPR, above, art 8(3)(b). 
177 ICCPR, above, art 8(3)(c). 
178 ICCPR, above, art 23(2). 
179 Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel, 
Arlington (Va), 1993), 409 - 410: for example restrictions on the grounds of consanguinity and 
affinity and the prohibition of bigamy. 
180 Lansman v Finland (8 November 1994) Human Rights Committee Communication No 
511/ 1992 CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992; Malwika v New Zealand (15 November 2000) Human 
Rights Committee Communication No 547/1993. 
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test used under the Convention for the "necessary in a democratic society" limb 
of its limitations provisions, 
182 it is the test used by the Canadian courts for the 
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" limb of the Charter's 
limitations provision, 183 it is used to determine whether limitations are 
"reasonably required", 
184 and the Privy Council held it was the test for whether a 
limit was "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society".
185 The test in New 
Zealand for whether a limitation is "demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society" in accordance with section 5 of the Bill of Rights should be 
the proportionality test embodied in the principle of proportionality. 
3 The obligation to provide an "effective remedy": is Wednesbury judicial 
review an effective remedy? 
(a) The obligation to provide an effective remedy 
Under article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR New Zealand is required "to ensure 
that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall 
have an effective remedy .. . "
186 There are significant links between article 2(3) 
of the ICCPR and article 13 of the Convention. Article 13 of the Convention 
was based on the text of an early draft of the ICCPR, 
187 while article 2(3) of the 
ICCPR was then in turn based on article 13 of the Convention, though it goes 
further than the Convention.
188 Consequently, the ECHR jurisprudence on 
article 13 of the Convention is of relevance to New Zealand's obligations under 
the ICCPR. 
The relevance of article 2(3) of the ICCPR to the Bill of Rights has 
already been discussed above, in the context of Baigent's Case.
189 The Court of 
182 See n 170, above, and accompanying text. 
183 R v Oakes [1986] l SCR 103 (SCC). 
184 M 'membe and Another v The People [ 1996] 2 LRC 280, 287 (Zambia SC) . 
185 De Freitas v Ministry of Agriculture [1999] l AC 69, 80 (PC). 
186 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, art 
2(3)(a). 
187 Jean Raymond "A Contribution to the Interpretation of Article 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights" (1980) V HR Rev 161, 161- 162. 
188 Manfred Nowak UN Cove11a11t 011 Civil a11d Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel, 
Arlington (Va), 1993) 57 - 59: the priority of a judicial remedy and the duty of states to develop 
judicial remedies are implicit in art 2(3) . 
189 Si111pso11 v Attomey-Ce11eral [Baigent's Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
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Appeal recognised in Baigent's Case that the courts were obligated under the 
Bill of Rights to provide an effective remedy for violations of the rights and 
freedoms affirmed: "the Act is binding on us [by virtue of section 3], and we 
would fail in our duty if we did not give an effective remedy to a person whose 
legislatively affirmed rights have been infringed".
190 The range of remedies 
available is consonant with the range of remedies available in general law, 
including judicial review. In Goodwin Richardson J noted that:
191 
" ... the premise underlying the Act is that the Courts will affirmatively protect 
those fundamental rights and freedoms by recourse to appropriate remedies 
within their jurisdiction. Traditional remedies include the exclusion of 
evidence wrongly obtained, stay of proceedings, habeas corpus, damages for 
false imprisonment and judicial review of the exercise of statutory powers" 
[emphasis added]. 
The issue whether judicial review, limited to the Wednesbury approach, even 
where the threshold is lowered, constitutes an "effective remedy" in terms of 
New Zealand's international commitments is therefore of considerable 
importance. 
(b) ECHRjurisprudence: is judicial review an effective remedy? 
The issue of whether judicial review, restricted to the traditional heads of 
review, constitutes an "effective remedy" has been considered by the ECHR 
with regard to article 13 of the Convention. The starting point is the obligation 
article 13 192 places on states paities: 193 
Article 13 guarantees the availability of a remedy at national level to enforce 
the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they 
may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 
190 Baigent's Case, above, 676 Cooke P. 
191 R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153, 191 - 192 Richardson J (CA). 
192 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 
November 1950) 213 UNTS 221, art 13: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in 
this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity"; 
compare this with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 
999 UNTS 171, art 2(3)(a): "3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To 
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity". 
193 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439,481 para 120. Note that under the art 2(3) 
of the ICCPR priority is to be given to judicial remedies, and there is a duty on the state to 
develop judicial remedies for breaches of the ICCPR. See above n 188. 
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is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent 
'national authority' both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention 
complaint and to grant appropriate relief [emphasis added]. 
In early cases the Court found that the application of judicial review, in 
its "heightened scrutiny" application, was an effective remedy. In the cases of 
Soering 194 and Vilvarajah 195 judicial review was an effective remedy in terms of 
article 13. However, in Soering the judicial review application he had made was 
prior to the decision actually being taken by the relevant Minister and it had 
failed as it was therefore "premature". 196 Because of the fact that Soering could 
have brought a judicial review application at "the appropriate moment" and 
argued Wednesbury unreasonableness, and the fact that "such a claim would 
have been given 'the most anxious scrutiny' in view of the fundamental human 
right at stake" the Court held there had been no breach of article 13. 197 The 
Court relied on the House of Lords dicta in Budaycay suggesting the lowering of 
the threshold of the unreasonableness test in cases where the life of the applicant 
is at risk. 198 In Vilvarajah the Court accepted that their reasoning in Soering 
applied, 199 though there was a dissenting opinion that judicial review could not 
constitute an effective remedy where any facts were in dispute, as the reviewing 
194 Soering v United Kingdom, above. This case concerned the extradition of Soering, a West 
German national, to the United States on a murder charge that carried the death penalty on the 
basis that the "death row phenomenon" he would be subjected to before execution would 
constitute a breach of art 3 of the Convention, the right not to be subjected to torture or 
degrading treatment or punishment. The Court found that if Soering was deported it would 
constitute a breach of art 3; however, there was no breach of art 13. 
195 Vilvarajnh v United Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 248. This case concerned the rejection of an 
asylum claim by a number of Sri Lankan nationals by the United Kingdom. The authorities held 
that they did not have a well founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka and they were deported 
back to Sri Lanka. Subsequent to their deportation the appeals of all the applicants were allowed 
and at the time of this case all were back in the United Kingdom while their asylum applications 
were considered. All had applied for a judicial review of the initial decision to deport them, 
which in all cases had failed. Their case was brought to the ECHR alleging that they had 
reasonable grounds to fear that they would be subject to persecution, torture, arbitrary execution 
or inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to art 3 of the Convention if returned to Sri Lanka. 
They further alleged that they had no effective remedy under United Kingdom law in respect of 
their complaint under art 3. The Court held there was no breach of art 3 or of art 13. 
196 Soering, above, 447 para 22,481 para 122. 
197 Soering, above, 481 - 482 paras 122 - 124. 
198 Soering, above, 451 para 35. 
199 Vilvarajah, above, paras 117 - 127. 
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court was not able to examine the merits. 200 In both the Soering and Vilvarajah 
cases the Commission, unlike the Court, had found a breach of article 13.201 
In contrast to these two cases, in Chahal the Court found that there was a 
violation of article 13.202 In Chahal the basis for the deportation was national 
security, and consequently in the judicial review proceedings before the 
domestic courts the evidence before them was limited. The courts were limited 
to considering whether the Home Secretary had balanced the risks to the United 
Kingdom against the risks to the individual, although the scales were weighed 
towards the former consideration. The ECHR noted that in the Court of Appeal 
case it was held that the" ... Home Secretary appeared to have taken into account 
the evidence that the applicant might be persecuted and it was not possible for 
the court to judge whether his decision to deport was irrational or perverse 
because it did not have access to the evidence relating to the national security 
risk posed by Mr Chahal."203 The ECHR held that Chahal's article 3 rights were 
absolute and had to be assessed independently of the question of the security 
risk he might or might not pose to the United Kingdom. 204 In these 
circumstances judicial review did not constitute an effective remedy as the court 
could not " ... review the decision of the Home Secretary to deport Mr Chahal to 
India with reference solely to the question of risk, leaving aside national security 
considerations", instead the " ... courts' approach was one of satisfying 
themselves that the Home Secretary had balanced the risk to Mr Chahal against 
the danger to national security". 205 In this case the courts exercising judicial 
200 Vilvarajah v United Kingdom: Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Walsh joined by Judge 
Russo (1992) 14 EHRR 248, 294 para 2. 
201 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, 480 para 116; Vilvarajah v United 
Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 248, para 99. 
202 Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413, paras 145 - 155. This case concerned the 
intended deportation of a Sikh activist resident in the United Kingdom for a number of years and 
accused by the United Kingdom government of engaging in terrorist activities. He was to be 
deported on national security grounds, despite a finding that he had sufficient grounds to found a 
claim to asylum. He failed in judicial review proceedings, which were limited by the national 
security considerations in the evidence before them. The Court found that deportation would be 
a breach of art 3, and that in respect of his art 3 claim there had also been a breach of art 13. 
203 Chahal v United Ki11gdo111, above, para 41. 
204 Chahal v United Kingdom, above, paras 80- 81. 
205 Chahal v United Kingdom, above, para 151. 
37 
review could not deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint, 
as required by article 13.206 
In Smith and Grady2°7 the Court also found that judicial review was not 
an effective remedy in terms of article 13. Smith and Grady had challenged, by 
way of judicial review, the Ministry of Defence's blanket policy that any service 
person found to be homosexual would be dishonourably discharged from the 
service. Applying the Wednesbury head of review the Court of Appeal held that 
the policy could not be characterised as irrational even on the lowered threshold 
where fundamental rights and freedoms are engaged. 208 Smith and Grady 
challenged the decision in the ECHR on a number of grounds, including a 
violation of their article 13 right to an effective remedy. The ECHR held that 
there had been a breach of their right to an effective remedy: 209 
As was made clear by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the 
judicial review proceedings, since the Convention did not form part of 
English law, questions as to the whether the application of the policy 
violated the applicant's rights under Article 8 and, in particular, as to 
whether the policy had been shown by the authorities to respond to a 
pressing social need or to be proportionate to any legitimate aim served, 
were not questions to which answers could be properly offered. The sole 
issue before the domestic courts was whether the policy could be said to be 
"irrational". 
In such circumstances, the Court considers it clear that, even assuming the 
essential complaints of the applicants before this Court were before and 
considered by the domestic courts, the threshold at which the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal could find the Ministry of Defence policy irrational 
was placed so high that it effectively excluded any consideration by the 
domestic courts of the question of whether the interference with the 
applicants' rights answered a pressing social need or was proportionate to 
the national security and public order aims pursued . .. 
As with Chahal the substance of the applicants claims under the convention 
could not be considered by the courts in judicial review proceedings. In this case 
the substance of the claims was that the Ministry of Defence policy represented 
206 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, 481 para 120; Vilvarajah v United 
Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 248, para 122; Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EI-IRR 413, para 
145. 
207 S111ith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EI-IRR 493. 
208 R v Ministry of Defence ex parte S111ith [1996) QB 517, 558 Sir Thomas Bingham MR, 563 
Henry LJ, 566 Thorpe LJ (CA). 
209 Smith and Grady v United Ki11gdo111 (1999) 29 EI-IRR 493,542 - 544 paras 135 - 139. 
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an unjustified limitation on their Convention rights. The courts were not able to 
deal with this claim because as proportionality as a basis of review was 
unavailable, they were unable to consider whether the policy met the 
requirements for a limitation under the Convention. 
The Court also held that judicial review was an inadequate remedy for 
the purposes of article 13 in Hatton v United Kingdom. 210 This was decided on 
the basis that " ... the scope of review by the domestic courts was limited to the 
classic English public law concepts, such as irrationality, unlawfulness and 
patent unreasonableness, and did not allow consideration of whether the increase 
in night flights under the 1993 scheme represented a justifiable limitation on 
their right to respect for the private and family lives or the homes of those who 
live in the vicinity of Heathrow airport ... In these circumstances, the Court 
considers that the scope of review by the domestic courts .. . was not sufficient to 
comply with Article 13".211 The inability of traditional judicial review to 
consider the proportionality of limits on the applicant's article 8 rights meant 
that judicial review could not deal with the substance of the Convention 
complaint. The Court's analysis of the article 8 claim, in finding a breach, 
involves the application of the principle of proportionality. It was the failure of 
the United Kingdom government to conduct adequate research into the effects of 
the 1993 policy on article 8 rights of those living near the airport, "with the aim 
of finding the least onerous solution as regards human rights"2 12 [emphasis 
added], that defeated their claim to have adequately balanced the rights of the 
applicants with the justifications for the policy. 213 
The Court has also held in several cases that judicial review fails to 
satisfy the requirements of article 6(1) of the Convention214 and article 5(4) of 
2 10 Hatton v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 1. This case concerned an alleged violation of the 
art 8 guarantees of the right to respect for family and private life. The applicants argued that 
their right was breached by aircraft noise caused under a new landing policy at Heathrow for 
landing activity late at night and early in the morning, causing them physical and emotional 
distress from the inability to sleep. The Court found a breach of art 8 and art 13. 
2 11 Hatton v United Kingdom, above, paras 115 - 116. 
212 Hatton v United Kingdom, above, para 106. 
2 13 Hatton v United Kingdom, above, paras 94- 107. 
2 14 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 
November 1950) 213 UNTS 221 [the Convention] , art 6(1 ): "In the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations . .. everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing . .. by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law". Compare with the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 [ICCPR] , art 14(1): "In the 
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the Convention.215 The Court has held that judicial review did not satisfy the 
requirements of article 6(1) in a number of cases, on the basis that judicial 
review does not allow for a "determination" to be made in the sense required by 
article 6(1), because in judicial review the court does not have the jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of the matter.216 In some cases taken under article 5(4) cases 
it was held that judicial review did not meet the requirements of article 5(4) 
because "the scope of the control afforded [by judicial review] is ... not wide 
enough to bear on the conditions essential for the 'lawfulness,' in the sense of 
Article 5(4) of the Convention"217 These cases further demonstrate the 
limitations of traditional judicial review in a human rights context. 
Traditional judicial review will have difficulty in meeting the 
requirement that the competent 'national authority', in this case the courts, deal 
with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint, in particular where any 
limitation of the right requires an analysis under the principle of 
proportionality.21 8 It is also arguable that Wednesbury review in cases where 
other rights and freedoms are concerned will not be able to sufficiently deal with 
the substance of the complaint to qualify as an effective remedy. Even in 
heightened scrutiny situations, under the ex parte Smith approach, the margin of 
appreciation under Wednesbury and the reluctance of the courts to dispute 
findings of fact made within a decision makers discretion make it unlikely that 
where it is those very facts that are the basis of the dispute the court will be able 
determination of ... his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law". 
215 The Convention, art 5(4) : "Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention 
shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided 
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful". Compare with ICCPR, 
above, art 9(4): "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings before a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness 
of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful" . 
216 0 v u11ited Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 82, para 63; W v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 29, 
para 82; R v U11ited Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 74, para 87. All of these cases involved the 
placement of children into care by local authorities, who then denied all access to the parents. 
The parents were limited in their ability to challenge the denial of access through the courts to 
challenging the parental rights resolution , of applying for judicial review or of instituting 
wardship proceedings. The Court held in each of these cases that none of these alternatives met 
the requirements of art 6(1). 
217 Weeks v United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 293, para 69. This case concerned the decision by 
the executive to re-incarcerate an offender paroled from a life sentence after the commission of 
another offence while on parole. 
218 Under the Convention these are: art 8 Right to respect for private and family life; art 9 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion; art 10 Freedom of expression; art 11 Freedom of 
assembly and association. For the ICCPR see above Part IV(A)(2) of this paper. 
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to deal with the substance of the complaint. 219 The House of Lords recognised 
the limitations of even the stricter ex parte Smith approach in Daly,220 noting 
that:221 
[t]he differences in approach between the traditional grounds of review and 
the proportionality approach may therefore sometimes yield different results. 
It is therefore important that cases involving convention rights must be 
analysed in the correct way. 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon noted that the view that the standards of review under 
the traditional grounds of review and the higher standards of review under the 
convention or "the common law of human rights" are "substantially the same 
appears to have received its quietus in Smith and Grady v UK''.222 
(c) Implications for New Zealand and judicial review under the Bill of 
Rights 
Under the Bill of Rights there is one limitations provision, section 5, for 
all of the rights and freedoms protected. Under section 5 any limit must be 
evaluated against the p1inciple of proportionality, to determine whether the 
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" limb of section 5 is 
satisfied. Where an administrative action or decision limits a right of freedom 
protected by the Bill of Rights is judicially reviewed, the lawfulness of that limit 
cannot be determined by application of the traditional grounds of review. As the 
preceding discussion has made clear, traditional judicial review is too limited in 
scope to address the questions and conduct the analysis required under the 
proportionality test. This is clear from the United Kingdom jurisprudence under 
the Human Rights Act where the courts have stressed the importance of 
analysing the case in the correct way. 
In Soering and Vilvarajah, where judicial review was held to be an 
effective remedy, the rights in question were not ones with limitations 
2 19 This was the applicants' argument before the ECHR in both the Soering and the Vilvarajah 
cases: Soering v U11ited Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, 481 para 119; Vilvarajah v United 
Ki11gdom (1992) 14 EHRR 248, para 118. In both cases the Commission had agreed with the 
applicants that judicial review was too narrow to effectively deal with the substance of the 
applicants ' complaints: S0eri11g , para 116; Vil varajah, para 99. 
220 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433, 446 para 
27 Lord Steyn (HL(E)). 
22 1 Daly, above, 446 para 28 Lord Steyn. 
222 Daly, above, 447 para 32 Lord Cooke ofThorndon. 
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provisions requiring the application of the proportionality test, while all limits 
under section 5 of the Bill of Rights must satisfy the proportionality test. The 
application of traditional judicial review to cases involving limitations to rights 
protected by the Bill of Rights is therefore an inadequate approach that is likely 
to lead to the wrong result. Where the right limited is one that requires the 
limitation to meet the proportionality test under the ICCPR, this would 
constitute a breach of New Zealand's international obligations both with respect 
to the right, by imposing a limitation not allowed under the treaty, and of the 
obligation to provide an effective remedy. 
B Section 5 of the Bill of Rights, the Principle of Proportionality and the 
Control of Administrative Action 
The Bill of Rights has a potentially powerful impact on subordinate 
legislation and administrative decision making, and therefore on judicial review. 
In practice the Bill of Rights has not had the impact on administrative law and 
judicial review that some commentators anticipated. 223 The main area of impact 
of the Bill of Rights has been in criminal matters, mostly in terms of evidence 
exclusion, as well as freedom of expression matters such as injunctions, name 
suppression and defamation. 
Section 5 Jays down the test to determine what limits can lawfully be 
placed on the rights and freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights. Section 5 is 
subject to section 4, so any inconsistent enactments that are not section 5 
justified are not "impliedly repealed or revoked, or. .. in any way invalid or 
ineffective". 224 Any limit not protected by section 4 that fajjs the section 5 test is 
therefore unlawful. While section 4 protects both inconsistent subordinate 
legislation, as well as inconsistent primary legislation, the empowering sections 
of the Act authorising the creation of the subordinate legislation must be 
interpreted consistent with the Bill of Rights under section 6. Therefore, unless 
the empowering sections clearly and unambiguously authorise the creation of 
subordinate legislation in breach of the Bill of Rights, then those empowering 
sections must be interpreted as only empowering the creation of Bill of Rights 
223 PA Joseph "Constitutional Review Now" (1988) NZLR 85 , 119. 
224 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. 
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consistent subordinate legislation, and any inconsistent regulations will be ultra 
vires. 225 Similarly, wide discretions granted to decision makers, in the absence 
of an explicit mandate to breach the Bill of Rights in the empowering section, 
must be exercised consistently with the Bill of Rights and unjustified limitations 
made pursuant to those discretions would be ultra vires the empowering section. 
The effect of the Bill of Rights on administrative decision making is 
clear: unless the decision making power is drawn by the empowering enactment 
in terms that expressly authorises a breach of the right or freedom in question, in 
which case they are protected by section 4,226 then the decision maker may only 
lawfully limit that right or freedom if they comply with section 5. If the decision 
falls outside of the terms of a justified limitation under section 5, then clearly the 
decision maker has sought to impose a limitation on a right or freedom that is 
not lawful and a remedy will be available to those whose rights or freedoms 
were breached. 227 
C Judicial Review and Proportionality in New Zealand: Current Position 
1 Is Proportionality a separate ground of review? 
Proportionality has not yet emerged as a separate head of review in New 
Zealand, except for limited application in the area of the proportionality of 
penalties imposed. 228 In Bevan229 the Court of Appeal upheld the quashing of 
Bevan' s punishment by the Institute of Chartered Accountants on the ground 
that it was "altogether excessive and out of proportion to the occasion".230 
However, the Court stressed that it was not holding that proportionality is a 
distinct head of review, instead the Court was limiting itself to " ... the penalty 
cases such as Hook and take[s] comfort from commentary on proportionality 
which, while recording the controversy about its separate existence, singles out 
225 Drew v Attorney-General [2002] l NZLR 58, para 68 (CA). 
226 Because any ambiguity in meaning will lead to a Bill of Rights consistent meaning being 
f referred under s6. 
27 The appropriate remedies ava ilable to the courts within their jurisdiction are available: R v 
Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153, 191 - 192 Richardson J (CA). 
228 In stitute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand v Bevan [2003] l NZLR 154 (CA). 
229 Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand v Bevan [2003 J l NZLR 154 (CA). 
230 Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand v Bevan, above, 171 para 53 . 
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the penalty area as established". 231 Thomas J had discussed proportionality in 
his obiter comments in Waitakere City Council v Lovelock. 232 The analysis there 
seemed to see proportionality as an aspect of unreasonableness, a proposition 
that with respect to the principle of proportionality in a human rights context is 
not correct.233 
These cases considered the question of proportionality as a separate head 
of review in judicial review in all cases. This paper is concerned with the 
mmower question of the availability of proportionality review in cases where a 
right of freedom protected by the Bill of Rights is at issue. In considering the 
emergence of proportionality as a head of review where Bill of Rights' rights 
and freedoms are at issue, it is important to recall that the Bill of Rights does 
more than preserve the status quo.234 The international obligations affirmed by 
the Bill of Rights are also of importance; New Zealand's obligations under 
article 2(3) of the ICCPR were an important part of the decision by the Court of 
Appeal to create a Bill of Rights action for compensation. 235 
2 New Zealand and the ex parte Smith approach: an altemative to 
proportionality? 
The fact that the intensity of review will vary with the subject matter of 
the case has been recognised in New Zealand. In Electoral Commission and 
Cameron236 the Court of Appeal noted that in the context of that case it was 
appropriate to "apply a somewhat lower standard of reasonableness than 
231 Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand v Bevan, above, 171 para 55. 
232 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [ 1997) 2 NZLR 385 (CA); Isaac v Minister of Consumer 
Affairs [1990) 2 NZLR 606, 635 - 636 (HC): Tipping J rejected proportionality as a separate 
¥:round of review, seeing it instead as an aspect of Wednesbury unreasonableness. 
33 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 407 - 408 Thomas J. Thomas J was discussing 
proportionality in the broader context of judicial review as a whole, and there may well be merit 
in his analysis for proportionality review outside the human rights context. However, as 
discussed above in Part III(D), the Wednesbury sense of proportionality and principle of 
proportionality in a human rights context are very different tests, as noted by Lord Ackner, R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [ 1991] l AC 696, 762 (HL(E)). 
234 Simpson v Attorney General {Baigent's Case] [1994) 3 NZLR 667, 676 Cooke P (CA): 
" ... the long title shows that, in affirming the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, 
the Act requires development of the law where necessary. Such a measure is not to be 
approached as if it did no more than preserve the status quo"; Ministry of Transport v Noort 
[1992) 3 NZLR 260,266,270 Cooke P (CA). 
235 Simpson v Attorney General {Baigent's Case} [1994] 3 NZLR 667,676 Cooke P, 690 - 691 
Casey J, 699 Hardie Boys J, 718 McKay J. See Part IV(A) above. 
236 Electoral Commission v Cameron (1997) 2 NZLR 421 (CA). 
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'irrationality' in the strict sense".237 At the other end of the spectrum the 
Woolworths (No 2)238 and Waitakere City Counci/239 cases indicated that in the 
context of the rate-striking decisions of local authorities the Wednesbury 
threshold the courts are to apply is a very high one.240 There is also the 
recognition that where human rights are at issue a "hard look" might be 
required. 241 The ex parte Smith approach to review where human rights are at 
issue would accord with the tenor of New Zealand administrative law as it 
stands. 
However, the ex parte Smith approach is not an alternative to the 
acceptance of proportionality as a ground of review where Bill of Rights' rights 
and freedoms are at issue. The main difficulty for such a claim is that the section 
5 test requires an analysis under the principle of proportionality, in order to meet 
New Zealand's international obligations, by the clear intent of the drafters of the 
Bill of Rights in modelling section 5 on section 1 of the Charter, and from 
consideration of other jurisdictions. As will be clear from the discussion below, 
the judicial review of any administrative action limiting a right or freedom 
protected by the Bill of Rights requires an assessment of the lawfulness of that 
limit in terms of section 5. The ex parte Smith approach is conceptually and 
analytically inappropriate for this task. The ECHR jurisprudence makes this 
clear, as do the requirements for establishing allowable limits under the ICCPR. 
The courts would risk breaching New Zealand's international obligations if they 
were to fail to assess correctly the lawfulness of a limitation to a right, by both 
breaching the individual 's protected right and by failing to provide an effective 
remedy. The courts would also fail in their constitutional duty to uphold the law. 
237 Electoral Commission v Cameron, above, 433 . 
238 Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537 (CA). 
239 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [1997] 2 NZLR 385 (CA). 
240 Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537, 552 
(CA): "It is common ground that the council weighed all the relevant considerations, did not 
have regard to irrelevant considerations, consulted adequately, followed all the appropriate 
statutory procedures and processes, and made its rating determinations in good faith and in what 
it judged to be the best interests of the city and its ratepayers. For the ultimate decisions to be 
invalidated as "unreasonable", to repeat expressions used in the cases, they must be so 
"perverse", "absurd" or "outrageous in [th eir] defiance of logic" that Parliament could not have 
contemplated such decisions being made by an elected council". 
241 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd [ 1998) NZAR 
58, 66; Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above, 403 Thomas J. 
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D The Principle of Proportionality and the Section 5 Test 
The New Zealand Courts have effectively endorsed the principle of 
proportionality as the test required under section 5 for justified limitations on the 
rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. After a discussion by 
Richardson J in Noort242 it was not until Moonen that the test was laid out by the 
Court of Appeal in detail. 243 However, the proportionality test is not assured yet 
in New Zealand as the Court of Appeal has in fact suggested that the 
formulation in Moonen is only a guide and other approaches may be taken. 244 As 
the United Kingdom cases show, in review cases dealing with limitations on 
rights it is important to analyse the case correctly;245 with respect to the Court of 
Appeal this paper submits that other approaches are not appropriate as they 
cannot ensure that the court will fulfil its legal obligation to correctly assess 
whether a limitation is demonstrably justified. 
A comparison of the Moonen test with the test in Daly illustrates the 
commonality of approach: 246 
242 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283-284 per Richardson J (CA). 
243 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 (CA). 
244 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2002] 2 NZLR 754, 760 para 14 - 15 (CA): 
"We emphasise, too, that the five-step discussion in Moonen 1 was immediately prefaced by the 
statement ... 'Although other approaches will probably lead to the same result, those concerned 
with the necessary analysis and application of ss 4, 5 and 6 of the Bill of Rights may in practice 
find the following approach helpful when it is said that the provisions of another Act abrogate or 
limit the rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill of Rights. ' Clearly, it was not intended to be 
prescriptive. "May" means may. The five-step approach may be helpful. Other approaches are 
open". 
245 R v Shay/er [2003] 1 AC 247, 285 para 75 Lord Hope of Craighead (HL(E)); R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Depart111ent, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433, 446 para 28 Lord Steyn 
(HL(E)) . 
246 A comparison with the Oakes test would show a similarly close correspondence. 
Principle of Proportionality - the House 
of Lords test in Daly241 
Is the legislative objective sufficient( y 
important to justify limiting a fundamental 
right? 
Are the measures designed to meet the 
legislative object rationally connected to 
it? 
Are the means used to impair the right or 
freedom no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective? 
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Moonen Test248 - Justifiable Limitations 
Under section S of the Bill of Rights 
"Identify the objective which the legislature 
was endeavouring to achieve by the provision 
in question. .. The importance and 
significance of that objective must then be 
assessed." 
[T]he limitation involved must be 
justifiable in the light of the objective ... The 
means used must also have a rational 
relationship with the objective ... " 
"The way in which the objective is statutorily 
achieved must be in reasonable proportion to 
the importance of the objective... and in 
achieving the objective there must be as little 
interference as possible with the right or 
freedom affected." 
The Moonen test satisfies New Zealand's international obligations and is 
consistent with the approaches to similarly worded prov1s10ns m the 
constitutions and Bills of Rights in other comparable jurisdictions. The 
application of the Moonen test in judicial review where the limitation of a right 
protected by the Bill of Rights is at issue, provided the court does not grant too 
wide a margin of appreciation to the decision-maker, would satisfy New 
Zealand's obligations by ensuring limitations are consistent with the 
requirements of the ICCPR and the obligation to provide an effective remedy. It 
is also worth noting that the Moonen test is being applied by the Ministry of 
Justice in carrying out section 7 reviews of legislation to determine whether any 
prima facie breaches of the Bill of Rights in draft legislation are justifiable 
limitations, suggesting that the Ministry of Justice for its part accepts that this is 
the correct test. 249 
247 R v Secretary of State for the Ho111e Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433, para 27 
r,er Lord Steyn. 
48 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17. 
249 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7; Ministry of Justice Guidelines 011 Process & 
Content of Legislation (2001 ed) para 4.1.2 <http://www.justice.govt.nz/lac/pubs/2001/ 
legislative_guide_2000/chapter_ 4.html> (last accessed 19 May 03). 
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V THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A The Proportionality Test 
Proportionality as a ground of review should be available in any judicial 
review case where there is a prima facie limitation of a right or freedom 
protected by the Bill of Rights. 250 As noted above, the decision-makers power 
must be exercised consistently with the Bill of Rights,251 unless the act limiting 
the right is insulated by section 4. However, given that most discretions are 
broadly drawn, it is unlikely that many empowering sections will grant the 
decision-maker either an explicit or an implied power to make unjustified 
limitations to fundamental rights and freedoms. Therefore, to be lawful the 
limitation must be section 5 justified, which involves an analysis of the 
limitation to ensure it is "prescribed by law"252 and "demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society", the latter requiring the application of the principle 
of proportionality. The burden of proof is on the authority seeking to establish 
the lawfulness of a limitation.253 
B Proportionality: A sub-species of Irrationality? 
Objections raised to the acceptance of proportionality as a head of 
review also stem from a belief that proportionality is already incorporated into 
the irrationality head of review, m the doctrine of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness. 254 For example, Thomas J in Waitakere City Council v 
250 Moonen, above, 16 - 17 paras 16 - 19. 
251 The decision-maker will be caught by either s 3(a) or 3(b) making their acts subject to the 
Bill of Rights. In addition unless the empowering enactment explicitly, or by necessary 
implication, authorises the decision-maker to act inconsistently with the Bill of Rights then as 6 
reading of the empowering enactment will mean that the power must be exercised consistently 
with the Bill of Rights (a conclusion buttressed bys 3). 
252 The requirements of this limb are not considered in this paper. 
253 White Paper A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1985) AJHR A6, para 10.29; Minist,y of 
Transport v Noort [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 Richardson J (CA); R v Shayler [2003] l AC 247, 
281 paras 59 and 61 Lord Hope of Craighead (HL(E)). 
254 Isaac v Minister of Consumer Affairs (1990] 2 NZLR 606, 636 (HC); The Rt Hon Lord 
Hoffman "The influence of the European Principle of Proportionality upon UK Law" in Evelyn 
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Lovelock saw proportionality as an aspect of unreasonableness, though the 
unreasonableness test threshold advocated was lower than the traditional 
Wednesbury test. 255 
Proportionality mandates a review where the threshold of successful 
review is materially lower than the traditional Wednesbury test, or even the 
heightened scrutiny test under Smith. The arguments that " [i]rrationality is a 
higher level concept that includes lack of proportionality as one of its forms"256 
does not withstand close analysis without abandoning the traditional formulation 
of Wednesbury unreasonableness. This argument is even less persuasive in the 
human rights context given the content of the principle of proportionality and 
the analytical steps and criteria that must be satisfied to insulate the decision 
from proportionality review. As discussed above in Part III(D), Lord Ackner 
correctly distinguished the principle of proportionality from this Wednesbury 
application of a concept of proportionality. 257 
Nor does a lower threshold Wednesbury review ensure the court will 
reach the same decision as it would in applying the principle of proportionality 
in human rights cases. Of course it is always possible that in a given case a 
decision that would fail the proportionality requirements would also fail a high 
intensity-low threshold Wednesbury review, that outcome cannot be assured, as 
the House of Lords has accepted. 258 It is for this reason that the use of the 
correct analytical approach has been stressed. 259 
Ellis (ed) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart, Oxford, 1999) 107, 108-
109. 
255 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [1 997] 2 NZLR 385, 406-418 per Thomas J (CA). 
256 Lord Hoffman, above, 109. 
257 R v Secretary of State for th e Home Department, ex parte Brind [ 1991] l AC 696, 762 Lord 
Ackner (HL(E)). 
258 R v Secretary of State for th e Home Department, ex pa rte Daly [200 l ] 3 All ER 433 , 446 para 
28 per Lord Steyn (HL(E)). 
259 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly, above, 446 para 28 per Lord 
Steyn (HL(E)); R v Shayler [2003] l AC 247, 285 para 75 Lord Hope of Craighead (HL(E)). 
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C Judicial Review and Proportionality: Constitutional Issues 
I Proportionality: review on the merits? 
Resistance to proportionality stems from the kinds of concerns noted in 
Brind, that it represents a shift towards the review of the merits of a decision in 
judicial review. 260 The court in Daly, despite endorsing the principle of 
proportionality, emphasised that this was not a shift to review on the merits, that 
"the respective roles of judges and administrators are fundamentally distinct and 
will remain so".261 Subsequent decisions suggested that the margin of 
appreciation the court allows the decision-maker preserves the exercise as a 
review. 
However, the denial of a shift to merits review is at odds with earlier 
observations in Daly that review under proportionality may require an 
assessment of the balance that the decision maker has made and to the relative 
weight accorded to interests and considerations of the decision maker. 262 Such 
an exercise will clearly push the review over the line from process review to 
merits review. The allowance of a margin of appreciation does not change the 
exercise from a merits review to a review of the process of decision making; 
arguably what it does do is allow the process to be distinguished from an appeal 
where no such allowance would be made, with the court coming to its own 
conclusions of fact on the basis of evidence presented. Even with a margin of 
appreciation the court must still turn its mind to the merits of the case in order to 
carry out the necessary analytical steps of the proportionality test, 263 it must 
260 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] l AC 696, 749 Lord 
Bridge of Harwich, 750 Lord Roskill , 762 - 763 Lord Ackner (HL(E)). 
26 1 R v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433, para 28 
~er Lord Steyn (HL(E)). 
62 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433, para 27 
fer Lord Steyn (HL(E)). 
63 For example, R (Samaroo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 
1139, para 39 Dyson LJ (CA): "The Secretary of State must show that he has struck a fair 
balance between the individual's right to respect for family life and the prevention of crime and 
disorder. How much weight he gives to each factor will be the subject of careful scrutiny by the 
court. The court will interfere with the weight accorded by the decision-maker if, despite an 
allowance for the appropriate margin of discretion, it concludes that the weight accorded was 
unfair and unreasonable. In this respect, the level of scrutiny is undoubtedly more intense than 
it is when a decision is subject to review on traditional Wednesbury grounds, where the court 
usually refuses to examine the weight accorded by the decision-maker to the various relevant 
factors" [emphasis added]. 
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catTy out a "close and penetrating examination of the factual justification' 
26
~ for 
the limitation. 
As discussed above the courts have in fact been involved in merits 
review through the Wednesbury unreasonableness head of review. 265 So the 
mere fact that proportionality involves a degree of merits review, which will 
vary in intensity with the width of the margin of appreciation afforded the 
decision-maker, is not in itself constitutionally novel, or dangerous. Lord 
Ackner in the House of Lords was reluctant to accept proportionality as a head 
of review until Parliament had incorporated the Convention. 266 With the 
incorporation of the Convention by Parliament in the Human Rights Act the 
House of Lords did not hesitate to take that step. In New Zealand Parliament 
enacted the Bill of Rights, and with it a limitations provision that requires the 
use of the principle of proportionality by the courts to determine the lawfulness 
of limitations on the rights and freedoms protected. 267 Any reluctance on the part 
of the courts to embrace proportionality as a head of review where rights and 
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights are at issue is misplaced. It is the courts 
duty to take the step and fulfil its constitutional role in determining the 
lawfulness of limits in accordance with the Bill of Rights. 
2 Proportionality and the separation of powers 
Underlying the proposition that proportionality represents too great a 
move to merits review is the concern that applying the proportionality approach 
would lead the courts to exceed their proper constitutional role, in effect 
undermining the proper separation of powers. There are two main responses to 
this: firstly, the courts are can-ying out the intention of Parliament in applying 
the proportionality test, which is explicitly mandated by section 5 of the Bill of 
Rights; and secondly, the margin of appreciation that the courts afford the 
decision maker maintains the exercise as a review, rather than an appeal, and 
264 R v Shay/er [2003) I AC 247 , 281 para 61 Lord Hope of Craighead (HL(E)). 
265 See Part II(B) above. 
266 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind, above, 762 - 763 Lord 
Ackner. 
267 The White Paper recognised that the assessment of limits the affirmed rights and freedoms by 
the courts under section 5 involved a substantive test, see White Paper A Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand (1985) AJHR A6, para 10.30. 
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keeps the review within acceptable constitutional boundaries. Ultimately, 
section 4 of the Bill of Rights preserves Parliamentary sovereignty and allows 
Parliament to override the courts assessment of whether a limitation is justified 
under section 5. 
The English Court of Appeal in Mahmood noted that the challenge under 
the Human Rights Act is striking the right balance between judicial scrutiny and 
democratic legitimacy. 268 As critics of strong judicial review are fond of noting, 
the courts are not elected and there needs to be recognition by the courts of the 
legitimacy of democratic decisions made by the legislature. This tension 
between the role of the courts in review and the legitimacy of democratic 
decision making processes can be overstated. While the broad discretion that an 
administrative official acts under may have resulted from a democratic decision 
making process, by the passage of legislation, the use of that discretion to limit 
fundamental rights and freedoms by an unelected official is no more 
"democratic" than the review of that official's acts by an unelected judge. Many 
administrative powers granted under regulations are another step removed from 
the direct democratic decision making process of primary legislation. In any 
event, it is clearly the constitutional role of the court to determine the law, and 
where fundamental rights have been implemented into the law it becomes their 
constitutional role to determine the lawfulness of any limitations to those rights. 
The margin of appreciation, also called the doctrine of deference or 
respect, recognises that in some cases the courts are not in the best position, as a 
matter of law and legal principle, to make a decision. In those instances a wider 
margin of appreciation is granted to the decision-maker, the legislative or 
executive branch as the case may be, though the courts must be careful to assess 
the correct margin of appreciation. The margin of appreciation granted, which 
will vary with the right at issue and the context of the case, preserves the nature 
268 R (Mahmood) v Home Secretary (2001] 1 WLR 840, 854 - 855 Laws J (CA): "Much of the 
challenge presented by the enactment of the [Human Rights Act] consists in the search for a 
principled measure of scrutiny which will be loyal to Convention rights, but loyal also to the 
legitimate claims of democratic power. .. The Human Rights Act 1998 does not authorise the 
judges to stand in the shoes of Parliament's delegates, who are decision-makers given their 
responsibilities by the democratic arm of the state. The arrogation of such a power to judges 
would usurp those functions of government which are controlled and distributed by powers 
whose authority is derived from the ballot box. It follows there must be a principled distance 
between the court's adjudication in a case such as this and the Secretary of State's decision, 
based on his perception of the case's merits" . 
52 
of the proportionality review as a review rather than an appeal. In particular, it is 
important that the courts do not allow themselves to grant too wide a margin of 
appreciation and slip back into a Wednesbury approach to the review.
269 To do 
so would be to abdicate their constitutional duty, and the legal duty imposed on 
the courts by the Bill of Rights Act. The margin of appreciation is far narrower 
in a proportionality review under section 5 than in traditional judicial review. 
The court will consider all relevant issues, such as economic issues, 
administrative issues, social issues, moral and ethical issues, and legal issues.
270 
The mere fact that a decision has a policy element is not a legitimate basis to 
grant such a wide margin of appreciation that the review process is meaningless; 
to do so would be to deny the plaintiff their right to an effective remedy, and 
would constitute a breach of New Zealand's international obligations. 
The domestic use of the margin of appreciation is a matter of domestic 
decision making and constitutional arrangements. The international obligations 
imposed by the Convention and the ICCPR are imposed on the state, and 
generally it is up to the individual state to determine how those obligations will 
be met in the domestic context.
271 Ultimately, where there is recourse to an 
international body, that body will determine whether the state has met its 
obligations. Under the ICCPR the Human Rights Committee has stated that it 
does grant a margin of appreciation to states. That does not mean that the New 
269 Lord Woolf "European Court of Human Rights: On the Occasion of the Opening of the 
Judicial Year" (2003) 3 EHRLR 257, 260: "It is, however, of the greatest importance to make 
clear that, by recognising the need for respect, the British judges are not slipping backward and 
recreating their pre-Human Rights Act approach, the Wednesbury approach. Our courts are not 
approaching the issue of respect by merely asking whether a decision reached was one to which 
the decision-maker could reasonably come. The court instead applies the doctrine of respect in 
the context of considering the proportionality of the balance struck by the decision-maker. As 
Lord Steyn pointed out in Daly, this requires the reviewing national court to assess the balance 
struck by the decision-maker from the point of view of proportionality, to assess the relative 
weight accorded to the relevant interests and to inquire whether a limitation on a Convention 
right was necessary in a democratic society. In other words, the court has to ask itself whether 
there is a pressing social need justifying the decision and whether the response was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim that was being pursued. The doctrine of deference can only 
come into play by extending a degree of respect, and no more, to the national authorities when 
considering the issue of proportionality." This article is a speech by Lord Wolf, Lord Chief 
Justice of England and Wales, to the European Court of Human Rights on the United Kingdom 
experience under the Human Rights Act. 
270 Ministry of Transport v Noori [1992) 3 NZLR 260, 283 Richardson J (CA); Moo11e11 v Film 
and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 (CA). 
271 Andrew z Drzemczewski European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: A 
Comparative Study (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) 22; Mark Janis, Richard Kay, Anthony 
Bradley (eds) European Hu111a11 Rights Law: Text and Materials (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1995) 433; Manfred Nowak UN Covenant 011 Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 
(NP Engel, Arlington (Va), 1993) 53 - 54. 
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Zealand courts cannot, in their review of an executive action limiting a right, 
grant a margin of appreciation to the legislature or the decision maker as a 
matter of domestic constitutional arrangements. What it does mean is that the 
courts must be careful to ensure that they do not grant too wide a margin of 
appreciation, or else they will fail to ensure the individual an effective remedy 
and will themselves be in breach of New Zealand's international obligations. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights requires the application of the principle of 
proportionality to determine the lawfulness of any limits to rights and freedoms 
affirmed by the Bill of Rights. A consequence of this is that where limitations to 
rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill of Rights are at issue in judicial review, 
the courts must apply proportionality as a head of review. This is the position in 
the United Kingdom since the entry into force of the Human Rights Act. The 
acceptance of proportionality as a head of review will not represent a breach of 
the courts constitutional limits. The courts have a clear legal duty to determine 
the lawfulness of limitations to rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill of 
Rights, and to do so by the criteria laid out in section 5. The allowance of a 
margin of appreciation preserves the nature of the exercise as a review, though 
that margin is narrower than under traditional judicial review and the courts 
must be careful not to allow too wide a margin. 
The shift to proportionality review is supported by consideration of New 
Zealand's international obligations under the ICCPR, both with respect to 
permissible limitations and the obligation to provide an effective remedy. 
Judicial review restricted to the traditional heads of review, even following a 
"heightened scrutiny" Wednesbury standard, cannot meet the requirements 
under section 5 to determine the lawfulness of limits to rights and freedoms, and 
will not meet New Zealand's obligation to provide an effective remedy under 
the ICCPR. 
Why has the step not been taken in New Zealand, given how quickly the 
shift to proportionality review was taken in the United Kingdom after the 
Human Rights Act entered into force? Though not within the scope of this paper 
to examine this question in detail there are several possible answers that can be 
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ventured and the answer is probably a combination of these. In New Zealand 
there was no education campaign for judges and practitioners about the Bill of 
Rights and its potential impact. In the United Kingdom there was an extensive 
education campaign and considerable academic writing on the Human Rights 
Act during the two year period after its enactment until its entry into force on 2 
October 2000. 272 The United Kingdom's participation m the individual 
complaint system under the Convention, giving recourse to the ECHR for 
individuals, meant that judges and practitioners were reasonably aware of the 
ECHR's jurisprudence.273 The individual complaint system to the Human Rights 
Committee under the ICCPR is arguably not as effective a system of 
international enforcement. The familiarity of judges and practitioners in New 
Zealand generally with Committee reports and views would probably not bear 
comparison with the situation in the United Kingdom with regard to the ECHR. 
From the point of view of the judiciary there has not been an effective 
international body supervising judicial decisions under the ICCPR in the New 
Zealand case, while the United Kingdom has one of the worst records at the 
ECHR. 274 This robust international supervision provides a motivation to the 
domestic courts to approach the Human Rights Act in a similarly robust manner, 
or else face the embarrassment of falling short at the ECHR. There is no such 
external motivation in New Zealand. Finally, there may be the perpetuation of 
an attitude that New Zealand has no need of a Bill of Rights, or that the Bill of 
Rights need not import international human rights standards into New Zealand 
Jaw, as the common Jaw provides a sufficient protection of individual rights. 
This is simply not correct, as Lord Wolf has said, "[a]lthough, prior to the 
present administration, no Government of the United Kingdom had been 
prepared to give its citizens the 1ight to enforce human rights directly, it was 
272 Lord Woolf "European Court of Human Rights on the Occasion of the Opening of the 
Judicial Year" (2003) 3 EHRLR 257, 258 - 259; for the breadth of the training programmes 
developed see Lord Hope of Craighead "The Human Rights Act 1998: the Task of the Judges" 
( 1999) 20 Stat LR 185, 188 - 189. 
273 Lord Wolf, above, 259 . 
274 Lord Irvine of Lairg "The Inaugural Irvine Human Rights Lecture: The Human Rights Act 
Two Years On: An Analysis" (Durham University, l November 2002) 
<http://www.lcd.gov.uk/speeches/2002/lc0l l l02.htm> (last accessed 28 September 2003): 
"That is why, prior to the [Human Rights] Act, the European Court in Strasbourg found against 
the UK more times than against any other country except Italy." 
wron[!ly a umc>d that l-'K 1t1 n ' ,, r JU ' l a ' , ,11 ff un 'r th ' mm n la\\ 
a if the had uch a 1i....,ht" [ mpha'l' ad d].
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275 Lord Wolf, above, 258. 
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276 Ministry of Transport v Noori (1992] 3 NZLR 260,270 Cooke P ( A) . 
277 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Rel'ielV [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16 - 17 ( A). 
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